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ARTICLES

CLASSIFICATIONS THAT DISADVANTAGE NEWCOMERS
AND THE PROBLEM OF EQUALITY
Robert C. Farrell*
I.

INTRODUCTION

For those concerned with the substantial fiscal problems of
government, we have a solution. The solution is - Newcomers.
Newcomers are those who will become part of our community
in the future but who are not here yet. Like unidentified holders of a contingent remainder, newcomers are not yet around to
vote, to peddle influence, or to protect their turf. Since newcomers are not here to complain, now is the time to shift burdens
onto their shoulders. Make them pay a larger share of taxes.
Assign to them a smaller share of government largesse. Thanks
to disarray in American policy and law, sometimes this can
happen.
In 1988, when Stephanie Nordlinger purchased a new home
in the Baldwin Hills neighborhood of Los Angeles, her property
tax bill was almost five times that of her long-established
neighbors in similar homes. 1 In 1992, when Deshawn Green
moved from Louisiana to California and applied for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits, the monthly
benefit she received was less than one-third of the amount that

* BRA, Trinity College; J.D., Harvard University, Professor, Quinnipiac College
School of Law. The author thanks Tony Karajanis for his valuable research assistance
and Greg Loken for his helpful comments.
1. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992).
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long-term residents of California were receiving in the AFDC
program.' In 1993, when Governor Pete Wilson of California
faced a budget crisis, he proposed a constitutional amendment
to eliminate citizenship for those born in the United States to
parents who are illegal immigrants, thus making those children
ineligible for state welfare benefits.' When the federal government in the 1980s was unwilling to impose taxes at a rate
sufficient to pay for the level of services it was providing, it
borrowed and spent three trillion dollars4 that will have to be
repaid by future generations. Not surprisingly, members of
these future generation did not get to vote on those budgets.
What all of these situations have in common is that government is unwilling to ask current members of the community to
make any sacrifices but is quite willing to shift burdens onto
future newcomers. This is not a new practice, but lately there
seems to be a greater willingness to make use of it. This article
examines one part of this issue: the extent to which the Constitution permits states to discriminate against newcomers. Once a
person moves to a new state and becomes a resident of that
state, should that person not be considered a full-fledged resident of that state, entitled to all the same rights and benefits
the state accords to all the other residents who arrived there
earlier? Or is it permissible for the state to save some rights
and benefits for more established residents? Is it permissible for
the state to classify on the basis of length of residence within
the state? Are all state residents equal or are some more equal
than others?5

2. See Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
3. See Robert Reinhold, A Welcome for Immigrants Turns To Resentment, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 1993, at Al.
4. Robert D. Hershey, Jr., The Burden of Debt-A Special Report. Why Economists Fear the Deficit, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1992, at Dl; Robert Pear, Growing U.S.
Debt Is Limitir z Options For Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1993, at 1.
5. This article is concerned with state discrimination between newer and older
state residents. It does not address the related, but separate, topic of state discrimination between residents and nonresidents. Discrimination of that type does not ordinarily give rise to equal protection problems. See, e.g., Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S.
321, 328 (1983)("A bona fide residence requirement, appropriately defined and uniformly applied, furthers the substantial state interest in assuring that services provided for its residents are enjoyed only by residents. Such a requirement with respect to
attendance in public free schools does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."). Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 388-89
(1978)("Appellants urge, too, that distinctions drawn between residents and nonresi-
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The Supreme Court's response to these questions has been
inconsistent and inadequate. Shifting majorities on the Court
have produced a changing standard of review and a set of precedents that appear fact specific. The Court's opinions establish
no clear conceptual explanation for the results of the cases.
This 6article critically examines what the Court has done in this
area.

II. THE FACTUAL SETTINGS
In several ways states classify based of length of residence
within the state. The most common example is the law that
creates a durational residency requirement. These laws establish waiting periods before a new resident is eligible for government benefits or is able to participate fully in the state's political and legal processes. For example, states have established
one-year residence requirements to qualify for welfare benefits,'

dents are not permissible under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment when used to allocate access to recreational hunting."); Vlandis v. Kline,
412 U.S. 441, 452-53 (1973)("We fully recognize that a State has a legitimate interest
in protecting and preserving the quality of its colleges and universities and the right
of its own bona fide residents to attend such institutions on a preferential tuition
basis."); But see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 878 (1985)(A state
purpose to favor domestic industry at the expense of foreign corporations "constitutes
the very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to prevent ....

The Equal Protection Clause forbids a State to discriminate in

favor of its own residents solely by burdening 'the residents of other state members
of our federation.').
Although distinctions between residents and non-residents rarely create equal
protection problems, they are more likely to create constitutional problems under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, or the Commerce Clause. See, e.g.,
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 339 (1979) (holding Oklahoma statute forbidding
the transportation of natural minnows for sale out-of-state violated the Commerce
Clause.) Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) (holding Alaska statute creating hiring preference for state residents in the construction of the Alaska Pipeline violated
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV).
6. For earlier treatments of areas related to the topics covered in this article,
see generally William Cohen, Equal Treatment for Newcomers: The Core Meaning of
National and State Citizenship, 1 CONST. COMIMENTARY 9 (1984); Thomas R. McCoy,
Recent Equal Protection Decisions-FundamentalRight to Travel or "Newcomers" as a
Suspect Class?, 28 VAND. L. REV. 987 (1975); Gerald L. Neuman, TerritorialDiscrimination, Equal Protection, and Self-Determination, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 261 (1987);
Gary J. Simson, Discrimination Against Nonresidents and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 379 (1979); Jonathon D. Varat, State
'Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 487 (1981).
7. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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free medical care,' reduced tuition rates to state universities,9
voting,'0 and divorce." States have also established longer
residence requirements that must be satisfied before a new
resident is eligible to run for governor, 2 or state senator."
These durational residence requirements are temporary. After
the relevant time period has expired, the recently arrived resident will then be treated like all other, longer-term residents.
However, in the meantime, state law classifies residents into
two groups based solely on the length of their residency.
Some state laws have attempted to create permanent classifications based on residence. These laws select a fixed date and
then, either provide a benefit only to those who were residents
of the state on that date, or alternatively, use that date as a
baseline from which to measure comparatively higher or lower
benefits. For example, New Mexico created a property tax exemption for veterans who were state residents as of a particular past date. 4 New York granted a hiring preference to veterans who had been state residents on the date they entered
military service." Alaska attempted to distribute some of the
revenues from its oil bonanza to residents on the basis of the
number of years since statehood that they had been residents of
Alaska. 6 These statutes created permanent classifications
among residents, once again, based solely on the length of their
residence. Other statutes may have the effect of preferring older
residents over newcomers, even though the statute does not
explicitly classify on the basis of residence. A property tax
scheme that artificially freezes property tax assessments at
acquisition value in an inflationary real estate market will
always favor established residents over newcomers. 7

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
(1973).
13.
(1975).
14.
15.
16.
17.

See
See
See
See
See

Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211 (D.N.H. 1973), affd, 414 U.S. 802

See Sununu v. Stark, 383 F. Supp. 1287 (D.N.H 1974), affd, 420 U.S. 958
See
See
See
See

Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985).
Attorney Gen. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986).
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992).
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The Supreme Court has reviewed preferences of this type for
established residents over newcomers and has invalidated a
substantial percentage of them. But the Court has never gone
so far as to insist that states treat all residents, older and
newer, the same. Sometimes, according to the Court's opinions,
a state has sufficient reason to treat newcomers differently. The
next part of this article examines the framework the Court has
established to analyze these issues.

HI. THE COURT'S CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
A. Background: Equal Protection Analysis and the Right to
Travel
State preferences for established residents, over newer, are
usually treated as a problem of equal protection. However, the
appropriate standard of review for classifications that distinguish between older and newer residents has not always been
clear. The Court has sometimes applied the traditional rational
basis test and asked whether the distinction between older and
newer residents bears a rational relation to a legitimate state
interest. On the other hand, because discrimination against
newer residents may single out those who have recently exercised an implied fundamental right to interstate travel, the
Court will sometimes apply strict scrutiny. It will then ask
whether the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest. In order to identify the appropriate level of review, we must first determine what is the fundamental right to
travel.
The Supreme Court has consistently found that there is an
implied fundamental right to interstate travel, although no
clause in the Constitution expressly provides for it."5 While

18. See Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412 (1981); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.
160 (1941); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S.(6 Wall.) 35 (1867). The Court has also found
an implied fundamental right to travel outside the country. Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958). The Supreme Court
has not yet addressed the question of whether or not there is an implied fundamental right of intrastate travel, but at least one federal appellate court has recognized
such a right. See Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990).
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there is substantial agreement as to existence of such a right,
there is substantial disagreement among the justices as to its
source. 9 Perhaps the right to travel freely between the states
is best explained as "fundamental to the concept of our Federal
Union."20 Without such a right to travel freely from one state
to another, the United States of America would be reduced
from a federal union to a loose confederation of states.2'
The right to interstate travel includes, at least, a right of
physical movement across state borders. Thus, a tax on railroad
passengers leaving a state would be an infringement on the
right to travel.2 Presumably, also, any attempt by a state to
set up border crossings at state lines or customs stations at
which incoming persons would be stopped and searched would
violate the right to travel. However, these examples of border
crossings and customs stations are generally more hypothetical
than real. By far, the more important aspect of the right to
travel is the right "to migrate, resettle, find a new job, and
start a new life" in a new state. 23 Freedom to cross state borders is not enough. What really matters is what happens once
you have crossed state borders and decided to settle in a new
state. If, after resettling and becoming a resident of a new
state, I am still treated as less worthy than those who were
there before me, then my right to travel has been burdened.
The right to travel is thus more helpfully characterized as a
right to interstate migration.24
Justice Brennan has argued that this right to interstate migration is closely connected to, if not indistinguishable from, the
equality of citizenship that is required by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The first sentence of that Amendment states, "All
persons ...

are citizens ...

of the State wherein they re-

19. E.g., Zobel, 457 U.S. 55 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV); Edwards, 314 U.S. 160 (Douglas, J., concurring)
(citing the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Crandall, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (citing the Commerce Clause).
20. Guest, 383 U.S. at 757.
21. Zobel, 457 U.S. 67 (Brennan, J., concurring).
22. Crandall, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35.
23. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629.
24. Memorial Hosp., 415 U.S. at 258 (citing Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 238
(1970) (separate opinions of Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.)).
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side."' As Brennan pointed out, this clause implicitly authorizes states to treat noncitizens differently from citizens." However, it recognizes no degrees of citizenship based upon how
long a person has been within the jurisdiction of the state.
Significantly, "the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment expressly equates citizenship only with simple
residence. That Clause does not provide for, and does not allow
for, degrees of citizenship based on length of residence.""
Brennan's analysis suggests that, among bona fide residents, no
distinctions whatsoever would be permitted. The majority of the
Court has not adopted this extreme view. The next section
examines how the Court began to establish a framework within
which to evaluate claims of discrimination against newcomers.
B. Round I: DurationalResidence Requirements as Penalties
on the Right to Travel
In three early cases involving durational residence requirements, the Court sent the message that such requirements
were unacceptable burdens on the right to travel and that they
would readily trigger strict judicial scrutiny. In Shapiro v.
Thompson," Dunn v. Blumstein,2 9 and Memorial Hospital v.
Maricopa County," the Court applied strict scrutiny and invalidated one-year residence requirements for welfare, voting, and
free medical care respectively. These three cases seemed to
make clear that a classification would be subjected to strict
scrutiny because of its negative impact on the right to travel in
three situations: (1)if the purpose of the law was to inhibit
interstate travel; (2)if the effect of the law was to deter interstate travel; or (3)if the law served as a penalty on the exercise
of the right to interstate travel.
The first of these grounds for heightened review was a legislative purpose to inhibit interstate travel. The attorneys defending the durational residence requirement in Shapiro sought to

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 69 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id.
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
405 U.S. 330 (1972).

30. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
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defend the statute on the grounds that it would prevent
indigents from moving into the state in order to qualify for
generous welfare benefits.3 The Court's response was that a
law enacted with such a purpose was "patently unconstitutional.,,32 It is never permissible if a law serves no other state's
interest than to attempt to "chill the assertion of constitutional
rights."3 3 A law designed to prevent out-of-staters from enter-

ing into a state, is an attempt to chill the assertion of constitutional rights. Unless the state can identify some other legitimate purpose the law serves, a law adopted with such a purpose is unconstitutional. After Shapiro, it would be unusual for
a government attorney to attempt to defend a law in court on
the ground that its purpose is to inhibit migration, but even
today state legislators occasionally leave incriminating evidence
that excluding indigents is precisely the purpose of a new
law.'
The second ground for heightened scrutiny identified by the
Court's early decisions was the possibility of deterrence of the
right to travel. 35 An indigent currently receiving welfare assistance in State A would likely be deterred from moving to State
B if the price of that move was the loss of basic subsistence for
the period of one year. Such deterrence of the fundamental
right to travel would trigger strict scrutiny. However, it would
be a rare case in which actual deterrence of a specific individual could be demonstrated. To the extent a residence requirement is successful in deterring the resident of State A from
moving to State B, it is also likely to deter lawsuits challenging
the waiting period. The deterred resident of State A, still residing in State A, is not likely to bring a lawsuit challenging the
residence requirement of State B. Given the improbability of
finding an actual plaintiff who would claim that she had been
deterred from moving, the Court did not insist on actual deterrence in order to trigger strict scrutiny, just the likelihood of

31. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 628-29.
J2. Id. at 631 (citing United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968)).
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Steffen, 487 N.W.2d 896, 900, 902 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992),
affd, 504 N.W.2d 198 (Minn. 1993).
35. Memorial Hosp., 415 U.S. at 256-59; Dunn, 405 U.S. at 339-40; Shapiro, 394
U.S. at 629.
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deterrence." These difficulties make the deterrence argument
a seldom used tactic.
The third, the most important, and the most frequent ground
for heightened scrutiny in this area is that a law penalizes
those who have recently exercised their right to travel from one
state to another 7 The Shapiro-Dunn-Memorial Hospital line
of cases made no attempt to define the parameters of this penalty analysis, but did identify two specific kinds of impermissible penalties on recent arrivals. The first was the denial, even
though temporary, of basic necessities of life, such as welfare or
medical care."8 The second was the denial of a fundamental
right such as voting.39
The decisions in Shapiro, Dunn, and Memorial Hospital left
open substantial questions concerning the penalty analysis.
Most importantly, the opinions did not make clear how much
negative impact a state may attach to the recent exercise of the
right to travel before that state action becomes a penalty. The
Court conceded that some waiting periods might not be penalties," but did not explain "how to distinguish a waiting period
which is a penalty from one which is not."4 These three opinions did, however, leave the impression that durational residence requirements would be very difficult to defend under the
Constitution.
C. Round II: The Court Ignores Its Precedents:Durational
Residence Requirements As Serving A Legitimate Purpose
While the Court was strictly scrutinizing and invalidating
durational residency requirements as penalties on the right to
travel in Shapiro, Dunn, and Memorial Hospital, it was also
deciding related cases with quite different results. Shortly after
Shapiro and Dunn, but before Memorial Hospital, the Court

36. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 339-40.
37. Memorial Hosp., 415 U.S. at 258-59; Dunn, 405 U.S. at 338; Shapiro, 394
U.S. at 634.
38. Memorial Hosp., 415 U.S. at 259.
39. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 341-42.
40. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638 n.21.
41. Memorial Hosp., 415 U.S. at 284 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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decided Vlandis v. Kline.12 That case did not address a durational residence requirement but it did concern a closely related
subject. In Vlandis, a Connecticut state law provided that an
unmarried student who had been a nonresident for any part of
the one-year period immediately prior to her application to the
state university would retain that nonresident status for the
entire period of her attendance at the university.' The rule
thus did not purport to differentiate between different classes of
residents. Its focus was on the distinction between residents
and nonresidents. The rule made it difficult, however, to move
from one status to the other. The Court invalidated the rule on
the grounds that it created a permanent irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence that violated the due process clause." The
flaw in Connecticut's rule was that it provided "no opportunity
for students who applied from out of State to demonstrate that
they have become bona fide Connecticut residents."45
Today Vlandis is considered to be something of an oddity,
with little precedential value. Its "irrebuttable presumption"
reasoning was a curious mix of Due Process and Equal Protection elements,' and was widely criticized in the academic literature,47 and later effectively rejected by the Court itself. 8
42. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
43. Id. at 442. The statute was slightly more lenient to married students. In
determining whether a married student, living with his spouse, was a resident, the
statute looked to the student's residence at the time of the application, but did not
consider the one-year period before the application. Id. at 442-43.
44. Id. at 452-53.
45. Id. at 453.
46. See Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or Due Protection, 72 MIcH. L. REv. 800 (1974).
47. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1622 (2d ed. 1988)
("M]ost commentators have regarded the Court's invocation of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine as analytically confused and ultimately unhelpful.") (citing Note,
The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1534
(1974); Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449
(1975)). Professor Tribe is one of the few defenders of the irrebuttable presumption
doctrine. See id. at 1618-25.
48. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). In Salfi, Justice Rehnquist's
opinion for the majority did not explicitly overrule Vlandis, Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972), or Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), all of
which had used the irrebuttable presumption reasoning. Salfi, 422 U.S. at 771-72.
However, little was left of them after Salfi. Justice Rehnquist held that those cases
were not controlling and purported to distinguish them. He feared that the extension
of the holdings in those cases "would turn the doctrine of those cases into a virtual
engine of destruction for countless legislative judgments which have heretofore been
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What remains of Vlandis is its explicit factual holding-that
students should be given a chance to demonstrate that they
had become bona fide residents after they had applied to the
university-and its implicit approval of the one-year durational
residence requirement for lower in-state university tuition.
The validity of one-year durational residence requirements
was not before the Court in Vlandis. Once the Court had set
aside the rule that froze residence status as of the time of application, the only requirement left was a simple current residence requirement, which the plaintiffs were able to satisfy.4 9
However, not wanting to leave well enough alone, the Court
suggested that its decision in Vlandis should not be "construed
to deny a State the right to impose on a student, as one element in demonstrating bona fide residence, a reasonable durational residency
requirement which can be met while in student
50
status.
The Court then referred approvingly to its earlier summary
affirmance of Starns v. Malkerson.5' That case involved a oneyear durational residence requirement for eligibility for lower
in-state tuition at the University of Minnesota. With its quick,
approving reference to Starns, the Court left unanswered the
effect of Shapiro and Dunn on durational residence requirements for lower university tuition. It is at least plausible to
argue that Minnesota's one-year waiting period served to penalize those who had recently exercised their right to migrate to
Minnesota. Certainly, recently arrived bona fide residents would
not qualify for a benefit that was available to long-term residents. Perhaps the loss of a reduced tuition benefit is less significant than the loss of welfare benefits, and is therefore not a
penalty. Perhaps a university education is less fundamental
than the right to vote, and thus, once again, there is no penalty. These arguments may or may not be persuasive, but the
Court did not even address them.

thought wholly consistent with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution." Salfi, 422 U.S. at 772.
49. Viandis, 412 U.S. at 445, 454.
50. Id. at 452.
51. 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), affd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971).
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Instead, the Vlandis Court attempted to avoid the whole
question of penalties by describing Minnesota's durational residence requirement as "merely one element which Minnesota required to demonstrate bona fide domicile."5 2 That characterization of the Minnesota waiting period was misleading. Until a
newcomer had lived in the state for one year, that person could
not make the required evidentiary showing, no matter what
other persuasive evidence of residence was produced. Thus, the
Minnesota statute gave far more weight to the one-year residence requirement than the Court's comments suggest. Given
the preclusive effect that the Minnesota statute assigned to one
year of residence, Justices Marshall and Brennan were of the
opinion that Shapiro and Dunn raised serious questions about
its continuing validity." However, since that issue was not
before the Court in Vlandis, Marshall and Brennan declined to
decide it.54
Around the same time the Court was deciding Vlandis, it
also summarily affirmed two district court judgments that had
rejected constitutional challenges to New Hampshire's sevenyear durational residence requirements for governor and state
senator respectively.5 5 The reasoning of the district court in
the first of these cases, Chimento v. Stark," was confused. On
the one hand, the court found that the seven-year requirement
to run for governor did not penalize and was not an impediment to interstate travel, and was too far attenuated to constitute an infringement of that right.5 7 Nevertheless, the court
seems to have applied strict scrutiny to the seven-year waiting
period.5 8 Surprisingly, given the level of scrutiny, the waiting
period survived. Presumably, but not obviously from the court's
opinion, the waiting period was necessary to achieve the compelling interest of "maintaining a responsive and responsible
government through the democratic process.""

52. Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 453 n.9.
53. Id. at 455 (Marshall, J., concurring).
54. Id.
55. Sununu v. Stark, 383 F. Supp. 1287 (D.N.H. 1974) affd, 420 U.S. 958 (1975);
Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211 (D.N.H.), affd, 414 U.S. 802 (1973).
56. 353 F. Supp. 1211 (D.N.H.), affd, 414 U.S. 802 (1973).
57. Id. at 1218.
58. Id. at 1214.
59. Id. at 1215.
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Two years later, the Supreme Court similarly affirmed the
district court's decision in Sununu v. Stark,0 which upheld a
seven-year residence requirement to run for state senator. The
district court applied the compelling interest test." It was not
clear why. Two of the three judges on the panel were of the
opinion that strict scrutiny was not the right test, but that if it
were, the seven-year waiting period could not be said to be
necessary to achieve a compelling interest.6 2 The Court's summary affirmance of both Sununu and Chimento did nothing to
explain what kind of adverse impact would provoke strict scrutiny nor what kind of necessity would satisfy that standard.
Once again, the precedential effect of Shapiro and Dunn was
not explained.
The Supreme Court was given a chance to clarify matters in
1975, in Sosna v. Iowa.' That case involved a one-year durational residence requirement on eligibility to bring a divorce
action. The Court's opinion is remarkable. It never mentioned
the Equal Protection Clause, the right to travel, the word "penalty", or what standard of review it was applying. The Court's
holding was that the case "requires a different resolution of the
constitutional issue"' than was the case in Shapiro, Dunn,
and Memorial Hospital. One was left to surmise why the case
required a different resolution. The court at one point suggested
that the plaintiff in Sosna was different from the plaintiffs in
Shapiro, Dunn, and Memorial Hospital, in that she was not
"irretrievably foreclosed" from obtaining some part of what she
sought. 5 That is, after one year, she could get her divorce. But
the same could be said of the plaintiffs in the other cases. After
one year, they would qualify for welfare benefits, be eligible to
vote, or qualify for medical care. What was lost, permanently,
was the receipt of those benefits for the first year. Likewise,
Ms. Sosna permanently lost the ability to be legally divorced
from her husband during her first year of residence. The

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

383 F. Supp. 1287 (D.N.H. 1974), affd, 420 U.S. 958 (1975).
Id. at 1290.
Id. at 1292 (Campbell and Gignoux, JJ., concurring).
419 U.S. 393 (1975).
Id. at 409.
Id. at 406.
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Court's attempt to identify a factual distinction was thus extremely weak.
After its decision in Sosna, the framework from which to
measure the constitutional validity of durational residence requirements was anything but settled. The Court had sent contradictory signals concerning the amount of impact to the right
to travel required to trigger strict scrutiny and on whether that
test could be satisfied. Indeed, the Court had implicitly suggested that the issue need not be considered at all. The most one
could say after Sosna was that one-year durational residence
requirements are invalid when imposed for welfare, voting, and
medical care, but valid when imposed for in-state tuition, high
elective office, and divorce actions. The Court had given no
guidance to explain the different conclusions and-then, perhaps
prudently given its conceptual disarray, retired from this area
of the law for seven years.
D. Round III: Fixed Date Residence Requirements and Rational
Basis Review
In 1982, the Court once again had a chance to clarify the
validity of discrimination against new residents. In Zobel v.
Williams,66 the Court reviewed an Alaska statute that distributed a portion of Alaska's oil revenues to state residents based
on the length of residence. Under the Alaska plan, each Alaska
resident received one dividend unit for each year of residency
since 1959, the first year of Alaska's statehood.67 The distribution plan raised obvious questions under the Shapiro-DunnMemorial Hospital line of cases in that it preferred older residents over newer residents who had recently exercised their
right to travel. Plausibly, the permanent denial of the right to
receive the fullest share of benefits was as much a penalty on
the right to travel as were the temporary waiting periods in the
earlier cases. On the other hand, how could it be a penalty to
award dividend shares, of whatever amount, to recent arrivals
when no other state from which the arrivals might have departed offered any such dividends at all?

66. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
67. Id. at 57.
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The Court declined to address these issues. Instead, the
Court decided that, since the statutory scheme could not even
pass the minimal rationality standard, it was unnecessary to
"decide whether any enhanced scrutiny is called for."' This
methodology is surprising in that the Court had to twist the
traditional deferential rationality review into an unrecognizable
form in order to find the Alaska statute irrational. Surely the
Alaska legislature might have believed that the dividend classifications would further to some extent the purposes of: (1) creating financial incentives for individuals to establish and maintain residence in Alaska; (2) encouraging prudent management
of the Permanent Fund; and (3) recognizing past contributions.69 The fact that there may have been many better ways
to achieve those purposes would not be relevant under traditional rational basis review. The classifications would be rationally related to conceivable state purposes and would be upheld.
The Court, however, applied a much more demanding test.
With regard to the purpose of creating incentives for establishing and maintaining residence, the Court found that the purpose was not furthered by the dividend distribution scheme.7"
If Alaska wanted more people to establish and maintain residence in Alaska, then the prospective enactment of a dividend
program would promote that goal. The retrospective award of
twenty-one years of dividend credits for people who had already
lived in Alaska for the past twenty-one years would be no incentive at all for recent arrivals to remain in Alaska or for outof-staters to move to Alaska in the first place.7 The selectively
greater awards to older residents was a very underinclusive
and ineffective way to promote residence in Alaska.
The Court also found that the dividend scheme did not further the purpose of furthering prudent management of the

68. Id. at 60-61.
69. These were the three purposes that the Alaska statute itself identified and
which were accepted by the Alaska Supreme Court. Id. at 61. The Permanent Fund
was established by an amendment to the Alaska Constitution as a fund into which
the state must deposit at least 25% of its mineral income each year. Id. at 57.
70. Id. at 61-62.
71. Id. at 62.
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Permanent Fund." The State argued that if the fund were
divided into equal shares, there would be pressure for short
term, high risk investment of the fund that would lead to the
rapacious development of natural resources.73 Current residents would want to get as much money as possible out of the
fund immediately, before the population of Alaska increased
and the fund had to be divided up into many additional shares.
Once again, however, the Court suggested that if Alaska wanted to promote a long-term perspective on the fund, it could do
so prospectively, by beginning the dividend count from the year
the statute was enacted. 4 In that manner, current residents
would have a greater share of the fund than the anticipated
future residents who would arrive during the next twenty
years; thus current residents would not need to push for immediate distribution of the fund. But, according to the Court, retrospective application of the statute was not necessary to
achieve this purpose. Awarding extra units to longtime residents but not to recent arrivals provided no additional protection against rapacious development that might occur because of
concerns over future population increase.
The Court found that the state's third purpose, rewarding
citizens for past contributions, was impermissible. 5 The Court
did not explain why this purpose was impermissible, but cited
Shapiro and Wandis for authority to that effect."6 The Court
was concerned that the past contributions argument would be
the first step down the slippery slope, "open[ing] the door to
state apportionment of other rights, benefits, and services according to length of residency."77
The Court's decision in Zobel leaves a great deal to be desired. As a rational basis decision, it clearly departs from the
traditional deference the Court normally accords legislative
judgments. The Court closely scrutinized both the purposes of
the law and the correlation between classification and purpose.
This close scrutiny is inconsistent with the Court's earlier ratio-

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 63.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 64.
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nal basis precedents." The Court's decision not to decide
whether a heightened level of scrutiny was necessary may have
been an attempt at judicial economy. But it leaves the underlying rationale of Zobel open to question. Two of the concurring
opinions pointed out that the majority opinion cannot stand on
its own. Justice O'Connor argued that, without reference to the
right to travel, the majority could not explain why the reward
for past contributions purpose was impermissible. 9 Justice
Brennan argued that the constitutional problems with the Alaska distribution plan arose at least in part from the right to
equal citizenship created by the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and from the right to free interstate migration." Neither Justices O'Connor nor Brennan would have decided the case on the rational basis standard alone.
Notwithstanding those criticisms, the Court continued to
follow the rational basis path three years later in Hooper v.
Bernalillo County Assessor." That case involved a property tax
exemption for veterans who had been New Mexico residents
before May 8, 1976. The statute divided resident veterans into
two groups-veterans who had resided in the state before May
8, 1976, and veterans who established residence after that
date.82 As in Zobel, the Court refused to address the question
of whether this classification was a penalty on the right to
travel." Since the scheme could not pass even minimal scrutiny, there was no need to decide if heightened scrutiny was
appropriate.
The State put forth two justifications for the classification.
The first was encouraging Vietnam veterans to move to New
Mexico.' The Court found that a statute enacted after the
78. E.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980)
("Where, as here, there are plausible reasons for Congress' action, our inquiry is at
an end. It is, of course, 'constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision,' Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. at 612, because this
Court has never insisted that a legislative body articulate its reasons for enacting a
statute.").
79. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 72 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 66, 69 (Brennan, J., concurring).
81. 472 U.S. 612 (1985).
82. Hooper, 472 U.S. at 616-17.
83. Id. at 618 ("As in Zobel, if the statutory scheme cannot pass even the minimum rationality test, our inquiry ends.").
84. Id. at 619.
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triggering date but given retroactive effect could not possibly
influence conduct that occurred before the law was enacted.85
A statute enacted in 1981 could not encourage veterans to move
to New Mexico before 1976. The second purpose was to reward
veterans for their military service.88 This was clearly a permissible purpose. But the limitations of benefits to those who resided in New Mexico before May 8, 1976 were not rationally
related to that justification. The statute was impermissibly
underinclusive in awarding the exemption only to a subclass
within the group of veterans.' Ordinarily, underinclusiveness
is not a concern under the rational basis standard.8 9
One year later, in Attorney General v. Soto-Lopez, s the
Court made yet another inconclusive and confusing statement
on the appropriate standard of review for classifications that
disadvantage newcomers. The facts were similar to those in
Hooper. This case involved a state law that created a preference
in civil service employment for those who had been residents at
the time they had entered military service.9' Once again, the
law divided resident veterans into two groups-those who had
been state residents when they entered military service and
those who became residents at a later date. 2 Although the
Court decided that the statute violated the Constitution, no

85. Id.
86. Id. at 620.
87. Id. at 620-21.
88. See id. at 621 ("The New Mexico statute, however, does not simply
distinguish between resident veterans and non-veteran residents; it confers a benefit
only on 'established' resident veterans . . . [Ilt is difficult to grasp how New Mexico
residents serving in the military suffered more than residents of other States who
served, so that the latter would not deserve the benefits a state bestows for national
military service.").
89. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). The Court in
Williamson stated:
The problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of
no doctrinaire definitions. Evils in the same field may be of different
dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think. . . . [Tihe reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to
the legislative mind ....
The legislature may select one phase of one
field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others.

Id.
90. 476 U.S. 898 (1986).
91. Id. at 900-01.
92. Id.
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opinion was able to command the votes of a majority of the
justices. Four justices thought that the classification should be
subjected to strict scrutiny and that it failed this standard.93
Two justices thought that strict scrutiny was unnecessary but
94
that the statute did not even survive the rational basis test.
Taken together, the votes of these six justices were sufficient to
invalidate the statute.
The plurality opinion of Justice Brennan first addressed
whether the law operated to penalize those persons who had
exercised their constitutional right of interstate migration.9 5 If
so, the State would have to demonstrate that its classification
was necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. The plurality explained that "even temporary deprivations of very important benefits and rights can operate to penalize migration."" Applying Zobel and Hooper, the plurality found that it
could be inferred that the creation of permanent distinctions
among residents based on the length or timing of their residence was a penalty on migration." In Soto-Lopez itself, the
plurality indicated that the plaintiffs may have been permanently deprived of civil service employment, a benefit that was
"significant" and "substantial."" Since the deprivation was
"based only on the fact of nonresidence at a past point in
time,"9 9 it was a penalty on the right to migrate and therefore
triggered strict scrutiny.
However, five justices in Soto-Lopez, a majority of the Court,
ruled that the right to travel was not sufficiently implicated to
require heightened scrutiny.'
Two of those five, however,
concurred in the judgment on the ground that, following Zobel
and Hooper, the statute could not even satisfy rational basis review.'' In dissent, Justice O'Connor severely criticized the

93. Id. at 899-912 (Justice Brennan announced the judgment of the Court in
which Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell joined.).
94. Id. at 912-16 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 916 (White, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 905-09.
96. Id. at 907.
97. Id. at 908.
98. Id. at 908-09.
99. Id. at 909.
100. Id. at 912-16 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 916 (White, J., concurring); id.
at 918-25 (O'Connor, Rehnquist and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
101. Id. at 912-16 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 916 (White, J., concurring).

566

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:547

plurality's "penalty" analysis. According to O'Connor, "it is fair
to infer that something more than a negligible or minimal impact on the right to travel is required before strict scrutiny is
applied."'0 2 The veterans' preference was limited, as it did not
directly restrict or burden the freedom to move to New York,
did not permanently deprive anyone of the right to participate
in a fundamental or significant activity, did not temporarily
deprive newcomers of fundamental rights or essential government services, and did not require newcomers to accept an
inferior status." 3 According to O'Connor, the plurality's penalty analysis was "ephemeral" and "unnecessary."'0 4 Therefore,
heightened scrutiny was inappropriate.
Notwithstanding Justice O'Connor's criticisms, the plurality
opinion found that the State's justifications for the resident
veterans' preference were insufficient to satisfy heightened
scrutiny. Although the purposes of encouraging and compensating veterans were legitimate, 5 the State could accomplish all
of its purposes by granting bonus points to all veterans, not
just veterans who had resided in New York when they entered
the military.'
Justice Brennan argued that under heightened
scrutiny, a state when choosing among alternatives must choose
the course of action that involves a lesser burden on constitutionally protected rights, such as the right to travel.1° '
After Zobel, Hooper, and Soto-Lopez, one could safely conclude that fixed date residence requirements which created
permanent advantages for long-term residents were unconstitutional. It would be difficult, however, to generalize beyond the
specific facts of these cases. One could not state clearly why the

102.
103.
104.
105.
ans:

Id. at 921 (O'Connor, J.,
Id. at 921-22 (O'Connor,
Id. at 923 (O'Connor, J.,
The State identified four

dissenting).
J., dissenting).
dissenting).
purposes served by the preference for resident veter-

(1) the encouragement of New York residents to join the Armed Services;
(2) the compensation of residents for service in time of war by helping
these veterans reestablish themselves upon coming home; (3) the inducement of veterans to return to New York after wartime service; and (4)
the employment of a "uniquely valuable class of public servants" who
possess useful experience acquired through their military service.
Id. at 909.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 909-10.
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requirements were unconstitutional nor the appropriate standard of review. One could not confidently predict how the Court
would respond in future cases where the nature or form of the
discrimination against newcomers was any different. The
Court's inability to achieve a clear consensus in this area continues to create uncertainty.' 8
The next part of this Article will examine the policy considerations which lead states to adopt laws that disadvantage newcomers. The Article will then consider difficulties with the
Court's analysis.
IV.

SUBSTANTIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DISADVANTAGING

NEWCOMERS

Why do they do it? That is, why are state legislatures so
willing to enact laws that disadvantage newcomers? One obvious response would be that newcomers are outsiders and it is
human nature not to be particularly concerned with the wellbeing of those who do not belong to your own group. 09 This

section will examine the justifications which have been proffered by the states themselves in defense of their preferential
laws. While some justifications are specifically related to a particular law, others are more general and recur quite regularly.
These recurring justifications include: (1) that the state may reward residents for past contributions; (2) that the state may
require satisfactory evidence that those who claim to be residents are residents in fact; (3) that the community may demand
that newcomers learn to share community values before they
are treated as a part of the community; (4) that the state
should not have to carry more than its fair share of the burden
of caring for those in need; (5) that the state must preserve its
fiscal integrity; and (6) that administrative necessity requires a
certain amount of time for the state to process information
about newcomers. This section examines each of these justifications in turn.

108. See infra part VI.
109. See McCoy, supra note 6, at 1019 ("Common experience indicates that something in the basic nature of man, some chauvinistic instinct, causes him to band
together into groups of 'insiders,' which then cultivate a sense of security by fervently
and irrationally discriminating against 'outsiders'.").
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A. Past ContributionsRationale
When state laws deprive newcomers of state benefits that are
provided to established residents, the state sometimes attempts
to justify the distinction on the basis of past contributions to
the community.1 ° Recent arrivals should not reap the rewards
of a system to which they have not contributed; established
residents should be able to reap that which they have created
through their contributions. Notwithstanding a certain plausibility and popular attraction to this argument, the Court as a
general matter has consistently rejected this "past contributions" rationale.
In Shapiro v. Thompson,"' the Court dealt with a narrower
version of this claim. The state argued that past tax contributions justified the limitation of welfare benefits to established
residents."' The Court rejected this claim, explaining:
[This] reasoning would logically permit the State to bar new
residents from schools, parks, and libraries or deprive them
of police and fire protection. Indeed it would permit the
state to apportion all benefits and services according to the
past tax contributions of its citizens. The Equal Protection
Clause prohibits such an apportionment of state
services."'
Why is it that the past tax contributions rationale is prohibited and how far does the prohibition go? The rationale has been
defended on the ground that it simply attempts "to achieve
partial cost equalization between those who have and those who
have not recently contributed to the state's economy through
employment, tax payments and expenditures therein.""4 This
past contributions/cost equalization reasoning has been acceptable to the Court in explaining, in part at least, why states
may preserve their resources for their own residents rather
110. E.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61 (1983); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 632-33 (1969).
111. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
112. Id. at 633.
113. Id. at 632-33.
114. Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 240 (D. Minn. 1970) affd, 401 U.S.
985 (1971).
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than for nonresidents."' Thus, in Wandis, the Court implicitly
approved this reasoning as the justification for a tuition differ116
ential between resident students and nonresident students.
However, as applied to distinctions between different classes
of residents, the past contributions rationale proves too much. If
government services can be apportioned on the basis of past tax
contributions, then why not apportion them on the basis of
present tax contributions? The state could then build special
parks, schools, and libraries to be used only by those affluent
taxpayers who have paid above-average tax "bills."' This
might not be objectionable in private market transactions where
it is assumed that benefits and services will be made available

115. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
The Court stated:
Appellees argue that the State constitutionally should be able to charge
nonresidents, who are not subject to the State's general taxing power,
more than it charges its residents, who are subject to that power and
who already have contributed to the programs that make elk hunting
We need not commit ourselves to our particular method of
possible ....
computing cost to the State of maintaining an environment in which elk
can survive in order to find the state's efforts rational, and not invidious,
The
and therefore not violative of the Equal Protection Clause ....
resident obviously assists in the production and maintenance of big-game
populations through taxes.
Id. at 389.
116. The State proffers three reasons to justify that permanent irrebuttable presumption. The first is that the State has a valid interest in equalizing the cost of
The
public higher education between Connecticut residents and nonresidents ....
State's objective of cost equalization between bona fide residents and nonresidents
may well be legitimate . . . ." Wandis, 412 U.S. at 448.
117. Although it is unlikely that a state or a local government would itself create
resources that would be available only to wealthy taxpayers, Robert Reich has argued
that, indirectly, this very kind of discrimination based on ability to pay is already
taking place. Reich states:
In many cities and towns, the wealthy have in effect withdrawn their
dollars from the support of public spaces and institutions shared by all
and dedicated the savings to their own private services. As public parks
and playgrounds deteriorate, there is a proliferation of private health
clubs, golf clubs, tennis clubs, skating clubs and every other type of recreational association in which costs are shared among members ....
[Sleveral cities have begun authorizing property owners in certain affluent districts to assess a surtax on local residents and businesses for amenities unavailable to other urban residents, services like extra garbage
The new community of
collections, street cleaning and security ....
people with like incomes and with the power to tax and enforce the law
is thus becoming a separate city within the city.
Robert Reich, Secession of the Successful, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1991, § 6, at 16.
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only to those who pay for them. In the marketplace, there is
supposed to be a correlation between one's wealth and one's
ability to consume. However, when the state provides benefits
and services, the recipient does not have to "buy" the product.
Government welfare programs distribute benefits on the basis
of need, not ability to pay. A "past tax contribution" rationale,
if taken to its logical conclusion, would turn the state into just
another purveyor of goods and services in a marketplace where
each taxpayer could expect to get what he or she paid for.
Such a system would, of course, be inconsistent with a theory
of government that has created an array of social welfare programs for the aged, the disabled, the sick, the unemployed, and
the indigent parent with dependent children. More to the point,
it is a system in which newcomers could never achieve parity
with long-established residents. If a thirty-year resident gets
"credit" for thirty years of tax payments, a newcomer will always be thirty years behind the oldtimers in terms of contributions to the community. But the state ought not be allowed
to make this kind of calculation in allocating benefits. This
reasoning fails to take into account that today's newcomers in
State A were probably yesterday's established residents in State
B. Their past tax contributions went to State B. To prefer longtime residents over these newcomers who have just moved to
State A is to create undeserved rewards simply for staying in
one place.
While the court's discussion in Shapiro had been limited to
past tax contributions, in Zobel v. Williams,"8 the Court
broadened its rejection of the past contributions rationale. The
Alaska dividend distribution scheme in Zobel had been defended in broader terms. In arguing that a distribution mechanism
based on length of residence was equitable, the state had urged
the Alaska Supreme Court to recognize "'contributions of various kinds, both tangible and intangible,' which residents have
made during their years of state residency.""' The Alaska
court had explained that these "contributions," in addition to
the payment of taxes, included contributions to the cultural and
political life of the state, enduring the rigors of a harsh climate,

118. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
119. Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 448, 458 (Alaska 1980), rev'd, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
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and putting up with a high cost of living.2 The Alaska court
found that it was legitimate to recognize these contributions in
distributing the oil fund.Y
The United States Supreme Court disagreed, finding that
rewarding citizens for past contributions, even broadly defined,
was not a legitimate state purpose.'
The majority opinion
did not explain why this purpose was impermissible. The closest it came to an explanation was a "slippery slope" argument.
If the dividend scheme were permissible, why couldn't Alaska
apportion other rights, benefits, and services according to length
of residence?'
Justices Brennan and O'Connor, in concurring opinions,
helped fill in the explanatory void. Justice Brennan identified
two basic flaws with the "past contributions" rationale. First,
state laws that reward residents for past residence have the
effect of creating a seniority system." Once the system is in
operation, a long-term resident who moves to another state
would forfeit her accrued seniority and would have to begin
again, building seniority in the new state. Other states might
adopt similar "seniority" systems. The result, according to
Brennan, would be that "the mobility so essential to the economic progress of our Nation, and so commonly accepted as a
fundamental aspect of our social order, would not long survive."' s
Brennan identified another basic flaw in the "past contributions" argument. He conceded the possibility that "to a limited
extent, recognition and reward of past public service have independent utility for the State, for such recognition may encourage other people to engage in comparably meritorious service." 6 But that type of reward for past actual service is unrelated to a reward simply for having been a resident of the
State in the past. 27 The dividend distribution statute counted

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id. at 459.
Zobel, 457 U.S. at 63.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 68 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 71 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
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years of residence, not levels of past contributions. Yet there is
no necessary or strong correlation between the two. Those who
had been children or paupers for the past twenty-one years
would have contributed very little to the state's economy, yet
would receive the full benefit. 128 Those who had arrived more
recently and helped to build the Alaska pipeline, which helped
to generate the oil revenue, would be treated as having made
12
insignificant contributions.
Justice O'Connor, concurring, offered another explanation for
the illegitimacy of the past contributions rationale in Zobel.
According to O'Connor, "[a] desire to compensate citizens for
their prior contributions is neither inherently invidious nor
irrational." 0 O'Connor suggested two examples of permissible
recognition of past contributions. The state might legitimately
award dividends on the basis of the number of years of prior
community service or create a retroactive tax credit for those
who had built alternative fuel sources or established recycling
plans. '' In support of her position, O'Connor might also have
cited the numerous federal and state preferences for veterans,
which the courts have always upheld and which are justified as
rewards for past contributions.3 2 The problem with the dividend allocation in Zobel, according to O'Connor, was not that it
rewarded past contributions, but that it attempted to achieve
this objective by disadvantaging those who had more recently
exercised their right to travel. Not all state rewards for past
contributions are impermissible, according to O'Connor, just
those that treat new residents less favorably than longer-term
residents who are the only ones who have "past contributions"
133
within the state to reward.
For a majority of the Court, the purpose of rewarding past
contributions of state residents is impermissible. No majority
opinion of the Court has explained adequately the reason why

128. Id. at 77 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 63 n.10.
130. Id. at 72 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
131. Id. at 73 n.1 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
132. Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986); Hooper v. Bernalillo
County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); Personnel Adn'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256 (1979).
133. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 72-73 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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past contributions may not be rewarded, and the assertion that
no past contributions can be rewarded is an exaggerated and
ultimately false claim. But a preference for established residents over newcomers, under the guise of rewarding past contributions, is impermissible.
B. Evidentiary Justification:DurationalResidence
Requirements and Bona Fide Residence
Quite apart from their relation to past actions of persons,
durational residence requirements have been defended on the
ground that the waiting period they establish provides evidence
of bona fide residence in the present.'3 4 There is a certain logic to this argument. To qualify for the status of resident, a
person must ordinarily have an intent to remain indefinitely.'35 The fact that I have been living in -a state for one year,
for example, is at least some evidence that I intend to stay
there indefinitely. The implicit underpinning of this argument
is that the durational residence requirement is not important in
itself, but it is helpful in determining that which is important-bona fide residence. This section first examines what a
bona fide residence requirement is and then considers the relation between bona fide residence requirements and durational
residence requirements.
1. Bona Fide Residence
The term "resident" is defined by state law and it needs to
be distinguished from its relatives, the terms state "citizen" and
state "domiciliary." First, with regard to a possible distinction
between "citizen" and "resident," there appears to have been a
time when the Court was of the opinion that there was such a
distinction and that the two terms were not interchangeable. "36
' However, in recent years, the Court has made clear,

134. See infra part 1V.B.2.
135. See infra text accompanying notes 144-48.
136. E.g., LaTourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1919) (-No discrimination
is made on account of citizenship. It rests alone on residence in the state and experience in the business.' And the court further said: 'Citizenship and residence are not
the same thing, nor does one include the other'."); see also, Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437
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at least with regard to the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
that the terms "citizen" and "resident" are essentially interchangeable.1 7 More generally, it appears that "the Citizenship
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment expressly equates citizenship with simple residence."138 Therefore, the concept of state

citizenship will not be addressed in this article.
The relationship between the concepts of resident and domicile is more difficult to explicate. The terms are not used consistently. According to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws, the more important of these terms is domicile.'39
Domicile is a status that a person can attain by physical presence at a place and the intent to make his home there, for the
time at least. 40 The required intent is sometimes spoken of as
an intent to remain indefinitely or of having no present intention of moving elsewhere,'
although the Restatement suggests that these latter two expressions "should not be taken
literally." According to the Restatement, no person can have
more than one domicile at a time.
By contrast to the relatively tight definition of "domicile"
envisioned by the Restatement, the concept of "residence" is
considered to be ambiguous. It may mean something more than
domicile, such as a domicile where a person actually dwells,'"

U.S. 518, 524 n.8 (1978).
137. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208,
216 (1984); Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 524 n.8 (1978); Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S.
656, 663 n.8 (1975).
138. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 70 n.2 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79 (1873) ('A citizen of the United States can, of
his own volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bona fide residence
therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State'.").
139. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws chooses to spell the word "domicil." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 11 (1971). The more common
spelling is "domicile". WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING
CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 4 n.1 (2d ed. 1993). According to the Restatement, the "personal law" that follows a person "in his travels and determines certain of his most important interests" is the law of the person's domicile. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11 cmt. c (1971). Conversely, "residence" is explained only as it
relates to domicile. Id. at cmt. k.
140. Id. at § 16 (Requisite of Physical Presence); id. at § 18 (Requisite Intention).
141. Id. at § 18 cmt. c.
142. Id.
143. Id. at § 11(2).
144. Id. at § 11 cmt. k.
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or it may mean something less than domicile, such as "where
the individual has an abode or where he has settled down to
live for a period of time, but not necessarily with such an intention of making a home there as to create a domicile." 5
Notwithstanding the Restatement's preference for the use of
the term "domicile," the term "residence" is more frequently
used in statutes. 146 Although the meaning of the term residence may vary depending on the context in which it is used,
the term most frequently is used to mean physical presence
along with an intent to remain indefinitely. "7 This definition
of residence is the effective equivalent of the Restatement's
definition of domicile. When the United States Supreme Court
speaks of "residence" in constitutional law cases, it is virtually
always speaking of residence as domicile, that is, physical presence with an intent to remain indefinitely. 4 8 Thus, this article
will use the term residence in that sense.
The concept of "residence" is used by state legislatures to
limit to residents the allocation of state rights and benefits. The
Supreme Court has never found any constitutional problem
with this sort of residence requirement. According to the Court,
"[a] bona fide residence requirement, appropriately defined and
uniformly applied, furthers the substantial state interest in
assuring that services provided for its residents are enjoyed
only by its residents."
The ability to limit rights and benefits to residents "may be necessary to preserve the basic conception of a political community."' If states could not recognize
legitimate differences between their own residents and the
residents of other states, then the fifty sovereign states would
be reduced to administrative departments of the federal govermnent. Residence requirements are not considered to implicate or penalize the right to travel because all one has to do to
take advantage of benefits in another state is to move there

145. Id.
146. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 139, at
vored by legislators seeking to establish rights and
link with a location.").
147. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,
148. See, e.g., Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321,
149. Id. at 328.
150. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 344.

§ 6[b] ("'Residence' is a term faduties on the basis of a person's
352 n.22 (1972).
330-31 (1983).
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and become a resident. 5 ' However, there are interpretive
problems with the concept of residence. The intent portion of
the residence definition creates two kinds of problems. The first
concerns the sufficiency of evidence of intent and the second is
the problem of multiple intents.
The sufficiency of evidence problem is that of determining a
person's inner state of mind. How can anyone know if another
person intends to remain indefinitely? Ultimately, any quest for
certainty in this area is futile. No one can ever be certain what
another is thinking or what is another's motivation. That said,
there is often objective evidence of inner intent. The Restatement of Conflicts explains that "[a] person's intentions must be
determined in the light of his declarations and other conduct
and of the circumstances in which he finds himself."'52 Specifically, relevant objective evidence of a person's intent to remain
or not remain would include where a person works, where she
lives, where she registers her car, where she obtains a driver's
license, where she owns property, and to what state she pays
taxes. 5 ' When the place of a person's residence becomes an
issue, all of these factors would be taken into account to determine presence or absence of intent to remain. But these factors
are not conclusive. A person who sought to take advantage of
residence benefits but did not have the requisite intent could
manufacture just this kind of evidence in order to bolster a
54
claim of residence.
It is in part because of this difficulty in determining a
person's intent to remain that states have made an additional
factor relevant to this determination-how long a person has
151. Martinez, 461 U.S. at 328-29.
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18 cmt. d (1971).
153. See, e.g., Dunn, 405 U.S. at 348.
154. See, e.g., Vlandis V. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 466 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist stated that:
it would not satisfy Connecticut's goals in seeking to subsidize the education of Connecticut's young people in Connecticut state universities to
impose a classic residency test as of the moment of entry into the system
of higher education. All students, and not only those with substantial
Connecticut connections, will be present in Connecticut on this date, and
those who have been astute enough to consult counsel will have obtained
Connecticut drivers' licenses, registered their cars in Connecticut, and
registered to vote in Connecticut.
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been present in the state. On the one hand, it is quite clear
that a newcomer can meet the test of residence immediately
upon his arrival in a new state.'55 For example, a person who
moves to Tennessee on any given day, and at that time intends
to stay there indefinitely, is immediately a resident of Tennessee. But mere transients may have incentives to lie about their
intent. Thus, the state may establish a requirement that a
newcomer must have been present in the state for a specified
period of time before the state really believes she intends to
remain. This is the origin of the relation between residence
requirements and durational requirements, and it will be evaluated in the next section.
The second problem in the determination of residence is the
problem of multiple intents. A person may have the requisite
intent to remain indefinitely but may also have other
overlapping intents or motives. The issue arises when a person
moves to a new state in order to qualify for a benefit or to
obtain some special advantage. For example, someone might
move to Connecticut to qualify for low tuition at the state university; another person might move to Iowa because the divorce
laws are favorable. According to the Restatement, so long as a
person is physically present within a state with an intention to
make that place her home, then she has satisfied the requirement of domicile, and "it is immaterial what led the person to
go there." 6' However, the fact that a move to a new state
"was dictated by a desire to obtain some special advantage, as
a divorce or the avoidance of taxes" is not entirely irrelevant. 5 ' A motive to move to another state solely to obtain a
special advantage may indicate only a temporary change of
place, rather than a bona fide intent to remain indefinitely in
the new state. Although relevant, evidence of these motives is
far from conclusive. No matter what one's motives in moving to
a new state, one is a resident once physically present with an
intent to remain indefinitely.

155. E.g., White v. Tennant, 31 W. Va 790, 8 S.E. 596 (1888) (Presence in a state
for less than one day along with intent to make one's home there for an indefinite

time sufficient to meet test of domicile.).
156. RESTATEMtENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18 cmt. f (1971).
157. Id.
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The issue of a person's motive for moving to a state becomes
a constitutional concern when states attempt to deter or to
penalize those who would immigrate with a particular motivation. In Shapiro v. Thompson,'58 the Supreme Court turned its
attention to the class of persons who had chosen to move to a
new state precisely because that state offered generous welfare
benefits.'59 The state laws at issue treated such persons as
"less deserving."' The court responded,
But we do not perceive why a mother who is seeking to
make a new life for herself and her children should be regarded as less deserving because she considers, among other
factors, the level of a State's public assistance. Surely such
a mother is no less deserving than a mother who moves
into a particular state in order to take advantage of its
better educational facilities.''
The message of Shapiro appeared to be that moving to a state
because of a desire to take advantage of state programs does
not prevent one from becoming a resident, and may not be used
as a reason to deny newcomers benefits made available to other, established residents.
Ironically, it is precisely with respect to "educational facilities" that the Court has most frequently disregarded the message of Shapiro. With regard to qualifying for lower, resident
university tuition rates, the Court has consistently upheld state
durational residence requirements that prevented newly arrived
persons from proving their residence in the state."2 In these
cases, the fact that one had moved to a state to obtain a university education is considered at least temporarily to exclude
the possibility of having an intent to remain there
indefinitely.'6 3 Most out-of-state students at a state university

158. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).

159. Id. at 628-29.
160. Id. at 631-32.
161. Id. at 632.
162. E.g., Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), affd, 401 U.S.
985 (1971).
163. Starns, 326 F. Supp. at 240. The court in Starns stated:
The regulation provides that an out-of-state student enrolled at the University is considered to be in Minnesota primarily for the purpose of
attending school, and is presumed not to be in the State as a permanent
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may have no intention of remaining after graduation. They are,
therefore, not residents. But it is inconsistent with the Restatement of Conflicts and the Court's ruling in Shapiro to
create a conclusive presumption that one who came to be a
student cannot have an intent to remain indefinitely.
In Martinez v Bynum,'4 the Court applied similar reasoning to a statute that prevented certain elementary school students from proving their intent to remain indefinitely and thus
qualify as residents for the purpose of attending public school.
According to the statute, a child not living with his parents
could qualify as a resident only if it was established "that his
presence in the school district is not for the primary purpose of
attending the public free schools."'65 The case may arguably
be defended on the ground that it is a reasonable attempt to
deal with the problem of children living apart from their parents when the residence of a child is ordinarily assumed to be
that of the child's parent.'66
But the Court's decision goes well beyond that because it
approves the distinction between those who are present with
the purpose of establishing a home (who qualify as residents),
and others who are here with the purpose of attending school
(who do not qualify as residents). The two purposes are not
mutually exclusive, however. One could move into the school
district to attend school and to establish a home. In Martinez v.
Byrum, 6' Roberto Morales was a student who had moved to
the McAllen Independent School District to live with his sister
but not his parents when he was eight years old." The evidence in the record, according to the majority, showed that
Morales intended to remain in the school district only until he

resident ....

We believe it is reasonable to presume that a person who

has not resided within the State for a year is a nonresident student, and
it is reasonable to require that to rebut this presumption the student
must be a bona fide domiciliary of the State for one year.
Id.
164. 461 U.S. 321 (1983).
165. Id. at 323 n.2 (citing TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031(d) (West. Supp. 1982)).
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 22(1) (1971) ("A minor has

the same domicile as the parent with whom he lives.").
167. 461 U.S. 321 (1983).
168. Id. at 322.
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completed his education (presumably ten years later).'6 9 The
dissent argued that there was no evidence in the record concerning his intentions after the completion of school so that no
inference concerning his intentions could be drawn.'70
Ordinarily, intentions to remain in the school district after
completing school satisfy the intent portion of the residence
test. However, the Court held that since Morales was living
with his sister, who acted as a custodian instead of a guardian,
he could not obtain tuition free assistance. 7 ' The statute disqualifying for assistance minors living apart from their parents
or guardians was valid because "primary and secondary education, of course, is one of the most important functions of local
government," and without certain residency requirements, the
quality of education would suffer.'72 The case illustrates the
Court's willingness, notwithstanding the contrary holding in
Shapiro, to allow evidence of one's reasons for moving to a new
state to negate the other evidence of intent to remain for a
substantial period of time. In doing so, the Court permits discrimination against bona fide new residents, including small
children.
2. Durational Residence Requirements as Evidence of Bona
Fide Residence
Given the difficulties in proving the required intent to remain, it is not surprising that states have resorted to the use of
durational residence requirements as evidence of bona fide residence. It is uncontroversial for a state to conclude that one has
an intent to remain based on the fact that he or she has lived
in the state for a one year period. The converse of this rule is
far more controversial: one who has not lived in the state for a
one year period could not have an intent to remain. This latter,
evidentiary use of durational residence requirements creates
logical and constitutional problems.
First, there is an obvious technical flaw in the argument that
duration of residence is a determinative factor in finding the
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

332 & n.15.
336 & n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
323.
329.
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status of residence. It is logically impossible for a person to be
a resident of a state for one year before that person can become
a resident of that state."' No one could ever satisfy such a
standard because it is backwards: the State must be willing to
confer the status of "resident" upon a person before he or she
can be a "resident" of the state for one year. Thus, the argument that durational residence requirements provide an administratively convenient means of determining residence must be
interpreted more narrowly. The one-year durational residence
requirement should mean merely that a new arrival must be
"present" within the state for one year, not that he or she have
any particular intent during that time.'7 4 To require a one
year waiting period plus proof of intent during that time contradicts any claim that a person is using the waiting period as
evidence of such as intent, which is not otherwise provable.
This was precisely the problem with the one-year durational
residence requirement adopted by the University of Maine,
which was successfully challenged in 1983Y1 As the University interpreted its rules, a student who lived in Maine for more
than one year could not qualify as a resident for tuition purposes simply by proving a present intent to remain. 7 In order
to qualify, he would have to prove that he had maintained such
an intent for the entire year prior to his request for residency. 77 This interpretation of the residence requirement violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it distinguished between residents based on whether they

173. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 350 & n.20 (1972). The Court stated in
Dunn:

As a technical matter, it makes no sense to say that one who has been a
resident for a fixed duration is presumed to be a resident. In order to
meet the durational residence requirement, one must, by definition, first
establish that he is a resident. A durational residence requirement is not
simply a waiting period after arrival in the state; it is a waiting period
after residence is established. Thus it is conceptually impossible to say
that a durational residence requirement is an administratively useful
device to determine residence.

Id. (emphasis in original).
174. Id. ("The State's argument must be that residence would be presumed from
simple presence in the State or county for the fixed waiting period.") (emphasis in

original).
175. Black v. Sullivan, 561 F. Supp. 1050 (D. Me. 1983).
176. Id. at 1068.
177. Id.
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had resided in Maine for longer than a year. 7 ' The requirement transformed the permissible evidentiary use of physical
presence in the state for one year into an unconstitutional distinction between 179
new bona fide domiciliaries and older bona
fide domiciliaries.

Even if a state durational residence requirement avoids logical flaws by emphasizing physical presence of some duration
rather than presence plus intent to remain, it is still subject to
constitutional difficulties. The Supreme Court has invalidated
the evidentiary use of durational residence requirements when
it applies strict scrutiny. 8 ° Such a test is overbroad to accomplish its purposes. On one hand, the test refuses to count as
residents, for tuition purposes, those who meet the statutory
standard of physical presence and intent to remain if those
persons have not resided in the state for a one-year period. On
the other hand, it treats as a legal resident one who has been
physically present in the state for more than one year, even if
the necessary statutory intent is lacking. Although one's physical presence in the state for one year may not be entirely irrelevant, "conclusive presumptions" based on that factor are too
crude and imprecise to survive strict scrutiny. 8 '
However, when applying rational basis review, the Supreme
Court has approved of the evidentiary use of a one year durational residence requirement. In Vlandis v. Kline,'82 the Court
suggested that a reasonable durational residency requirement
could be an appropriate element of a test for demonstrating
bona fide residence.'83 The Court then noted that it summarily affirmed the decision in Starks v. Malkerson, in which a one
year durational residence requirement for in-state tuition was

178. Id. at 1071.
179. Id. at 1070. As an example, the court said that although a one-year residence
requirement could be used to establish bona fide domiciliary status, the school could
not further require that the person be a bona fide domiciliary for a year prior to
receiving aid. Id. at 1071. In that sense, once a person has become a new, one-year
bona fide domiciliary, the Equal Protection Clause begins to protect them from disparate treatment.
180. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S, 330, 336 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 634 (1969).
181. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 351-52.
182. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
183. Id.
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upheld.' Although, as indicated above, such a use of durational residence requirements is overinclusive and
underinclusive, such a broad-brush classification is not considered unconstitutional under rational basis review.
Durational residence requirements are still used today. Most
state universities continue to require a student's one year presence in the state before he or she can qualify for in-state tuition.'85 The one year waiting period appears to be the maximum that would be allowed in this context, but arguably even
one year is too long if the state's concern is really the identification of a person's intent to remain. Still, the evidentiary use
of one year durational residence requirements is constitutionally
permissible, unless the Court is applying strict scrutiny.
C. CommunitarianJustification
Laws that disadvantage newcomers in relation to established
residents have been defended on the ground that it takes time
for newcomers to share the traditions and values of the new
community.' This defense derives from communitarian political theory, a theory that is often offered as an alternative to
classical liberalism.'87 The two theories provide contrasting
visions of the appropriate roles of the state, the community,
and the individual.
Liberalism emphasizes individual rights, individual liberty,
personal autonomy," and duties to others that are derived by

184. Id. at 452 & n.9 (citing Starks v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (Minn. 1970),
affd mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971)).
185. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10a-30 (West Supp. 1994) ("Unless the contrary appears . . . it shall be presumed that: (1) The establishment of a new domicile
in this state by an emancipated person has not occurred until he has resided in this
state for a period of not less than one year."). Id.
186. See infra text and accompanying notes 194-208.
187. Often cited works of communitarian political theory include LIBERALISM AND
ITS CRITICS (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984) [hereinafter CRITICS]; ALASDAIR C.
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed. 1984); MICHELL J.
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982). The classic modem statement of liberalism is JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); see, e.g., Stephen A.
Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH L. REV. 685 (1992).
188. See Rawls, supra note 187, at 3 ("Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought ....
Each person possesses an inviolability
founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override.").
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reason."i 9 In the liberal state, the rights of individuals have
priority over the public good.' The ideal liberal state provides a framework for a just society; it does not select a particular vision of the good to impose upon individual citizens. 9'
By contrast, communitarian theory insists that individuals are
formed in large measure by their membership in a community.'92 The community is a group of persons in which self-understandings,'' such as values, goals, and a vision of the
future, are shared. Such a community should promote a common vision of the good, even one that conflicts with individual
choices.
When a newcomer arrives into a new community, liberal and
communitarian theories suggest different responses. Because
the liberal state imposes no particular vision of the good, as-

189. Id. at 118-19.
The intuitive idea of justice as fairness is to think of the first principles
of justice as themselves the object of an original agreement in a suitably
defined initial situation. These principles are those which rational persons
concerned to advance their interests would accept in this position of
equality to settle the basic terms of their association.
Id.
190. Id. at 31 ("The principles of right, and so of justice, put limits on which satisfactions have value; they impose restrictions on what are reasonable conceptions of
one's good . . . . We can express this by saying that in justice as fairness the concept
of right is prior to that of the good.").
191. See Ronald M. Dworkin, Liberalism, in CRITICS supra note 187, at 63-64 stating:
The first [answer] supposes that government must be neutral on what
might be called the question of the good life . . . . The first theory of
equality supposes that political decisions must be, so far as is possible,
independent of any particular conception of the good life, or of what
gives value to life ....
Id.
192. CRITICS, supra note 187, at 5-6 (introduction).
Communitarian critics of rights-based liberalism say we cannot
conceive ourselves as independent in this way, as bearers of selves wholly detached from our aims and attachments. They say that certain of our
roles are partly constitutive of the persons we are-as citizens of a country, or members of a movement, or partisans of a cause. But if we are
partly defined by the communities we inhabit, then we must also be
implicated in the purposes and ends of those communities . . . . Openended though it may be, the story of my life is always embedded in the
story of those communities from which I derive my identity-whether
family or city, tribe or nation, party or cause.
Id.
193. CRITICS supra note 187, at 172-73.
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sumes no essential formation period for citizenship, and would
limit a person's liberty to move around only when necessary, a
new resident of the liberal state will be treated as an equal
from the moment of his or her arrival in the new state. At the
same time, however, it is not possible for a newcomer who has
just arrived, uninvited, in a communitarian society, which
shares values and goals, to place herself immediately within the
group's understanding of community. At the very least, it takes
time to come to share values and goals with your new
neighbors.
In reviewing communitarian justifications for laws that prefer
established residents, the court has reached conflicting results.
The Court has sometimes viewed these laws from the classical
liberal position and invalidated them. For example, in Dunn v.
Blumstein,"' the Court considered justifications for
Tennessee's one-year durational residence requirement to qualify to vote. The State's justification was communitarian. In order
to "further the goal of having 'knowledgeable voters,"' the waiting period was necessary to ensure that the new constituent
had "in fact, become a member of the community,"' had "a
common interest in all matters pertaining to [the community's]
government," 9 ' and was knowledgeable about local issues."7
Under the requirement, a recently arrived resident could not
meet these standards until having had time to develop the local
community outlook. The Court rejected Tennessee's argument as
parochial and unacceptable.' 98 The "common interest" that the
State sought to achieve was merely the exclusion of different
opinions.' Although new arrivals "may have a more national
outlook than longtime residents, or even may retain a viewpoint
characteristic of the region from which- they have come," differing ideas are not a permissible reason to deprive those holding them of the right to vote.00 Despite communitarian theory, the community was not free to impose a particularly local

194. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
195. Id. at 354.
196. Id.

197.
198.
199.
200.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

dissenting)).

356.
357-60.
355.
355-56 (quoting Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1969) (Marshall, J.,
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vision of the good on new arrivals. Applying strict scrutiny, the
Court found that the durational residence requirement
was not
20 1
interest.
state
compelling
a
promote
to
necessary
The Court also rejected the communitarian theory of residency requirements in Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor. °2 In
that case, the State attempted to justify a property tax exemption available only to established residents on the grounds that
it was appropriate as a measure for the State to take care of
"its own."2 °s Under this view, the State would not have to extend the exemption to new arrivals who had not yet become
part of the community. The Court's response was clear: "Newcomers, by establishing bona fide residence in the State, become
the State's 'own,' and may not be discriminated against solely
on the basis of their arrival in the State [after a certain
date]." 2 4 The statute was invalidated.
However, the Court has sometimes been willing to consider
long-term attachment to a community as justifying state classifications. In two related cases from New Hampshire, the
Court summarily affirmed district court decisions upholding the
state's seven-year durational residence requirement for gubernatorial 20 or state senatorial candidacy. 2°6 The district courts
had accepted explicitly communitarian justifications. The waiting requirements were constitutional because they allowed the
candidate time to achieve "familiarity with and awareness of
the conditions, needs, and problems of both the State of New
Hampshire and the various segments of the population within
the State."2 7 Specifically, the seven year waiting period would
"prevent frivolous candidacy by persons who have had little
previous exposure to the problems and desires of the people of
New Hampshire."2"' Apparently, merely residing in New
Hampshire, for six and one half years would not be enough for
a relative newcomer to take on the values of those citizens who

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
(1973).
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 360.
472 U.S. 612 (1985).
Id. at 623.
Id.
Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211 (D.N.H. 1973), affd, 414 U.S. 802
Sununu v. Stark, 383 F. Supp. 1287 (D.N.H. 1974), affd, 420 U.S. 958 (1975).
Chimento, 353 F. Supp. at 1215.
Id.
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have lived there longer. In both cases, the district courts, applying strict scrutiny, upheld these justifications.
Why is the Court willing to approve durational residence
requirements that prevent newcomers from running for elective
office yet unwilling to approve identical requirements which
prevent them from voting? A comparison with two other sets of
Supreme Court precedents reveals the lack of any principled
reason to support the difference in outcomes.
With regard to the exclusion of newcomers from elective
office, a comparison with the Court's decisions in the alienage
cases is instructive. Although discrimination against aliens in
the allocation of government benefits is suspect and is examined under strict scrutiny," 9 the Court has been far more
sympathetic to laws excluding aliens from high-level state employment.2 10 The Court has recognized "a State's interest in
establishing its own form of government, and in limiting participation in that government to those who are within 'the basic
conception of a political community'." 21 ' The State also has
"broad power to define its political community."2 12 This includes the power to exclude aliens from state government positions whose holders "participate directly in the formulation,
execution, or review of broad public policy."2 13 Those holding
such positions "perform functions that go to the heart of representative government."2 14
The reason that aliens are excluded from high-level government jobs is the perception that aliens are likely to lack something that is important for the job, while citizens are likely to
have it. Justice Rehnquist has pointed out what that qualification is. There is, in fact, a durational residence requirement of
five years before an alien can qualify to be naturalized as a
United States citizen.1 5 Rehnquist observed that the process
of naturalization, including the five-year waiting period, "was
specifically designed by Congress to require a foreign national

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
E.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
Id. at 642 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972)).
Id. at 643.
Id. at 647.
Id.
8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (Supp. 1993).
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to demonstrate that he or she is familiar with the history, traditions, and institutions of our society in a way that a nativeborn citizen would learn from formal education and basic social
contact."216 According to Rehnquist, since an alien lacks a lifelong background of our institutions, history, and traditions, "[iut
is not irrational to assume that aliens as a class are not familiar with how we as individuals
treat others and how we expect
217
'government' to treat us."

From the premise that aliens do not sufficiently share the
values of the community to hold high-level state positions, it is
a small step in logic to infer that newcomers from other states
do not sufficiently share the values of the community to run for
high elective office. This may well have been the premise behind New Hampshire's exclusion of newcomers from the positions of governor and state senator. There is, of course, a critical distinction between the exclusion of newcomers from other
states and the exclusion of aliens. The United States has the
power to close its border to all aliens, but New Hampshire is
only one state in a federal system which allows individuals free
travel from state to state. 18 Once an American citizen has become 2a19 state resident, he or she is supposed to be the state's
"own." The Court may have affirmed too hastily the New
Hampshire case in such a summary fashion.
Another area of the Court's constitutional jurisprudence also
suggests the need to reevaluate the communitarian theory of
residency requirements. The First Amendment protects the
freedom of association.2 20 That freedom includes both the right

to choose the persons with whom one will associate, and the
corresponding right to choose the persons with whom one does
not wish to associate.2 Similarly, a primary decision to be
made by any community is who qualifies as a member. 2 At
first glance, then, it might appear that the freedom of associa216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
(1958).
221.

Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 659 (Rehnqist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 662.
See supra part III.A.
Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 623 (1985).
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
TRIBE, supra note 47, at 1401.

222. See MICHAEL WALZER,

EQUALITY 31 (1983).

SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
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tion justifies a communitarian decision to exclude newcomers
from community membership.

But, there is a critical distinction that is fatal to that argument. The constitutional protection of freedom of association
extends only to truly private groups. These groups are characterized "by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree
of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation,
and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship."2' The larger the group, the less likely it is that the
Constitution will protect associational interests. Neither a large
corporation nor the United States Jaycees are of the size or
type to be accorded associational protection." A fortiori, a
state may not impose communitarian mandates on access to full
membership in the state.
In summary, the Court has approved the communitarian
justification when used as a candidacy requirement but rejected
it as a suffrage requirement. A consideration of the Court's
other precedents suggests that perhaps the communitarian
theory of residency requirements should be rejected in both
situations."
D. The Purpose of Excluding Undesirable Outsiders
In Shapiro v. Thompson,2 2 s the defendant sought to justify
the one year durational residence requirements on the ground
that they discouraged outsiders from moving to the jurisdiction
solely to qualify for generous welfare benefits."' The Court
held that this particular purpose was "patently unconstitutional."' Notwithstanding the clarity of the Court's rejection of
this purpose, legislators still attempt to prevent the immigra-

223. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984).
224. Id.
225. The opposing argument would be that although the right to vote is fundamental, an interest in being a candidate is not a fundamental right, Clements v. Fashing,
457 U.S. 957 (1982), and thus the Court is correct in its closer scrutiny of
communitarian justifications for voting than for candidacy. While this distinction holds
up when the restrictions on candidacy apply to all residents equally, it is not nearly
as strong when the restrictions are applied only to new residents.
226. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
227. Id. at 628-29.
228. Id. at 631 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968)).
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tion of out-of-state indigents.2 9 No state wants to be a welfare
haven. This section considers what, if anything, can be said to
defend this goal.

The state usually desires to exclude outsiders who will collect
welfare benefits. A state's public assistance program demonstrates that its citizens feel some sense of responsibility for
those who cannot feed, clothe, or house themselves. How far
should such generosity go? People are naturally willing to take
care of "their own." But the ability to take care of one's neighbor depends on his or her ability to define "neighbor."" Community or neighborly obligations have long been defined within
the narrowest possible geographic framework. There arises a
"contest of nonresponsiblity."" Each community seeks to define narrowly the group for which it is responsible and thus to
minimize its obligations to care for others. Historically, towns
accomplished this goal by passing paupers on to the next
town." Today, restrictive zoning ordinances combined with
artificially drawn boundary lines have the effect of keeping the
poor out altogether." As Robert Reich has explained,
If generosity and solidarity end at the border of similarly
valued properties, then the most fortunate can be virtuous
citizens at little cost. Since most people in one neighborhood

229. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Steffen, 487 N.W.2d 896, 902 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992),
affd, 504 N.W.2d 198 (Minn. 1993) ("The statements made by legislators during debate on the statute clearly show their desire to discourage people from moving into
Minnesota solely because of the availability of higher public assistance benefits.").
230. In The Bible, a lawyer asked Jesus who his neighbor was. Jesus' response
was to tell the parable of the good Samaritan. In that parable, the limits of neighborly obligation are shown to extend beyond the boundaries of one's own community.
The Samaritan was the one who showed himself to be a neighbor, even though Jews
did not associate with Samaritans. See Luke 10:25 to :37; John 4:9.
231. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 628 & n.7.
232. Id.
233. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713,
723 (N.J. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
This pattern of land use regulation has been adopted for the same purpose in developing municipality after developing municipality. Almost
everyone acts solely in its own selfish and parochial interest and in effect
builds a wall around itself to keep out those people or entities not adding favorably to the tax base, despite the location of the municipality or
the demand for varied kinds of housing. There has been no effective
intermunicipal or area planning or land use regulation.
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or town are equally well off, there is no cause for a guilty
conscience. If inhabitants of another area are poorer, let
them look to one another. Why should we pay for their
schools?'
Within such a system of nonresponsibility, the few communities that are willing to accept some responsibility for those in
need become a magnet to the poor citizens of cities around
them. The city which builds low-income public housing attracts
low-income persons from towns that do not provide low-income
housing." The city which provides a shelter for the homeless
attracts homeless people from areas without sheltersY6 The
state which enacts a generous welfare program attracts residents of states with underfunded or stingy welfare programs.
The problem is that where not everyone will do his or her
share, those who are willing to do their share become overburdened.
In this situation, it is not unreasonable for a city or a state
to attempt to limit the allocation of its finite resources to the
established residents of the city or state. Connecticut may be
willing to allocate a sufficient level of state resources to fund a
generous welfare program for all of its currently qualified indigent residents. It would be unwilling, and probably unable, to
allocate sufficient resources to support a welfare program for all
the indigent residents on the east coast who might flock to
Connecticut if Connecticut's benefit levels were substantially
higher than those in neighboring states. Connecticut's response
might be to keep its benefit levels low enough so as not to
attract outsiders. Alternatively, Connecticut might adopt a oneyear waiting period knowing that the probable effect of the

234.
16, 42
235.
236.
Al

Robert Reich, Secession of the Successful, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1991, § 6 at
(emphasis in original).
See Cole v. Housing Auth., 435 F.2d 807, 811 (1st Cir. 1970).
E.g., City Girds for Influx of Homeless, NEW HAVEN REG., Nov. 15, 1992, at

City officials fear state welfare cuts would force so many people into the
streets this winter that shelters may not be able to accommodate them.
Officials say they might be able to manage if they only had to help New
Haven's homeless, but if surrounding communities continue to send their
homeless to the city, the numbers could swell to more than 1,000.
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waiting period would be to discourage an influx of indigents
from other states.
Viewed from this perspective, the purpose of discouraging the
migration of those who seek to qualify for higher welfare benefits is not necessarily suspect. It can be viewed as a tool to
assure that Connecticut, already more generous to indigents
than its neighbors, is not forced to take on more than its proportionate share of the regional responsibility for indigents. If
other states were willing to be as generous as Connecticut,
there would be no incentive for indigents to move to Connecticut and thus no need for Connecticut to discourage their immigration.
The federal system accords sovereignty to every state, so that
each is free to decide how responsible it will be to indigents.
Furthermore, in the federal system, each person has the right
to travel freely between the states. In Shapiro, these two components of federalism made Connecticut look like the enemy of
federalism, when it arguably was reacting to an undue influx of
indigents caused by nonresponsibility elsewhere. The Court's
bottom line, however, was clear. The constitutional right to
travel supersedes any state law that tries to exclude indigents,
no matter what the context or the reasonableness of the underlying public policy. An end to the contest of nonresponsibility
can only come from collective political decisions made at the
regional or federal level.
E. Fiscal Integrity Justification
Preferences for established residents over newcomers are
sometimes defended on the ground that they preserve fiscal
integrityY7 Specifically, such preferences save money. The
savings arise both because the state need not provide services
to newcomers during the waiting period, and because the waiting period discourages outsiders who would use state services
from immigrating at all.238 Saving taxpayers' money is surely
a permissible governmental interest, but the Court has consis-

237. E.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 263 (1974); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627-28 (1969).
238. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 628-29.
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tently found that the distinctions between older and newer
residents are not a constitutional means to achieve that purpose. 9 Every class of persons that receives state funds is
similarly situated as to the purpose of saving state funds. But
why should the state be able to single out one particular class
of residents to bear the burden of cost savings? Selecting
brown-haired persons who would be ineligible for welfare would
surely save money, but such a classification would not be rationally related to a permissible purpose. Whether a citizen has
brown hair or not is unrelated to the goal of saving money.
Established residents and newcomers are similarly situated
with respect to the purpose of saving welfare funds. In order to
single out newcomers to bear the burden of saving state funds,
the state must justify its choice with a goal other than saving
money.
F. Administrative Necessity Justification
The Court has approved short waiting periods before newcomers are eligible to vote if those waiting periods are administratively necessary in order to establish accurate voter
lists. ° This approval appears to be premised on the understanding that the state is not excluding newcomers because
they are newcomers, but that the state needs some short period
of time to determine who is legally eligible to vote. Given this
understanding, the length of the time period should be no longer than it takes to perform the administrative tasks necessary
to prepare accurate voter lists. A one-year period is too
long."4 A .30-day period is clearly within constitutional boundaries. 2 A 50-day registration period "approaches the outer
constitutional limits in this area"' 3 but has been approved by
the Court as "necessary to promote the State's important interest in accurate voter lists."'

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id. at 633; Memorial Hosp., 415 U.S. at 263.
Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973); Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973).
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
Burns, 410 U.S. at 687.
Marston, 410 U.S. at 681.
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Although the Court has not evaluated the administrative
necessity justification outside of the voting cases, administrative
necessity might also justify short waiting periods in other contexts. For example, the statute in Shapiro might have been
upheld had it called for a waiting period of thirty days rather
than one year, and if its justification had been administrative
necessity rather than the exclusion of indigents.
G. Summary
The Court has consistently rejected the following justifications for imposing a disadvantage upon new residents: (1) rewarding past contributions; (2) excluding undesirable outsiders;
and (3) preserving fiscal integrity. The Court has been more
sympathetic toward, and has occasionally approved, the following justifications: (1) using durational residence requirements as
evidence of bona fide residence; (2) promoting communitarian
values; and (3) recognizing administrative necessity.
V. DIFFICULTIES WITH THE COURT'S FRAMEWORK FOR
ANALYZING STATE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NEWCOMERS
A. The Equal Protection Component of the Court's Analysis:
Classifications,Purpose, and Comparative Claims
To paraphrase the first Justice Marshall, let us not forget
that it is an Equal Protection Clause that we are expounding.245 With all its talk of penalties and fundamental rights,
the Court's opinions sometimes obscure this point. However, the
claims of newcomers are best understood as claims to equality
with established residents, and thus, complaints about comparative disadvantages. The Court's emphasis on "penalty on the
right to travel" has not been analytically helpful, both because
that standard is difficult to apply consistently and because the
Court has freely ignored it. Because some commentators have
suggested that cases involving fundamental rights are not equal

245. Cf McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) ("[W]e must
never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.").
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protection cases at all," 6 this section examines the equal protection element of the claims of newcomers.
The Equal Protection Clause is generally viewed as a limitation on government's ability to classify in certain situations."
Ordinarily, courts are very deferential to government classifications; they need only be rationally related to a permissible
governmental purpose." s Occasionally, courts are suspicious
about government classifications which may be based on prejudice, stereotypical views, or other irrelevant factors."9 The
Court subjects these classifications to a higher standard of
review. °
The question of correlation between classification and purpose
is necessarily a comparative judgment."5 The court must determine whether the members of a class are similarly situated

246. E.g., Michael Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1075 (1979) ("It made little sense, however, for the
court in Shapiro to treat the question posed by the disputed statutory provision as
an equal protection problem .... [Wihile the line or classification offended a consti-

tutional norm, the right of interstate migration, it did not offend or even implicate
the principle of equal protection."); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95
HARV. L. REV. 537, 560-61 (1982) ("But the Tundamental rights' cases may serve as a
congenial introduction because commentators have recognized that statements of
'equality' regarding fundamental rights invariably reduce to statements about
'rights.").
247. E.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 358 (1979) (plurality opinion) ("The
function [of the equal protection clause] is to measure the validity of classifications
created by state laws."); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 352 ("The Equal Protection
Clause places a limit on government by classification."); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 343-44 (1949).
248. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973).
249. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) ("Classifying persons according to
their race is more likely to reflect racial prejudice rather than legitimate public concerns."); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) ("Legislative classifications which distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the 'proper place' of women and their need for special protection.").
250. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432 ("[Racial] classifications are subject to the most
exacting scrutiny; to pass constitutional muster, they must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be 'necessary... to the accomplishment' of
their legitimate purpose."); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("To withstand
constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.").
251. See generally Kenneth W. Simons, Equality as A Comparative Right, 65 B.U.
L. REV. 387 (1985); contra Westen, supra note 246, at 552 ("This equation of comparative rights and equality is fundamentally misconceived").
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to nonmembers of the class with respect to the purpose of a
law. Professor Simons has written on the comparative nature of
the equal protection analysis:
A right to equal treatment is a comparative claim to receive
a particular treatment just because another person or class
receives it. The claim to that treatment is not absolute, but
relative to whether others receive it. And the claim is satisfied by giving the comparatively situated classes the required equal treatment."
Professor Simons illustrates the comparative nature of equality
with the following example. A parent who has three children
but takes only two of them to the movies is expected to have a
reason for leaving one child at home.25 That third child has
no independent claim to go to the movies. The only basis for
any complaint would be that if the third child's brother and
sister are going to the movies, the third child should be allowed
to go also. The parent could treat the three children equally by
either giving a reason for leaving the third child home, by taking all three children to the movies, or by leaving all three
children home.
While the comparative nature of equal protection is relatively
clear in cases challenging arbitrary classifications, the comparative nature of the fundamental rights branch of equal protection
is less obvious. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 4 the first case in
which the Court explicated the fundamental rights branch of
equal protection, the Court reviewed a statute that authorized
the state to sterilize a person convicted three times of felonies
involving moral turpitude. The statute's vision of moral turpitude included the felony of stealing more than twenty dollars
but did not include the felony of embezzling a similar amount
of money.2 55
The statute might have been challenged as a violation of due
process in that it would serve to deprive any sterilized person

252. Simons, supra note 251, at 389.
253. Id. at 390. Simons credits his example to Kenneth Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 250-51 (1983).
254. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
255. Id. at 538-39.
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of a substantial liberty interest." But rather than scrutinizing the liberty the defendant would lose, the Court emphasized
the comparatively disparate treatment accorded by the statute
to felons convicted of larceny as opposed to felons convicted of
embezzlement. The problem with the statute was not that it deprived the defendant of liberty, but that it treated him differently than other similarly situated felons. Applying strict scrutiny, the Court found a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
in the State's selective choice to sterilize only those "who have
thrice committed grand larceny with immunity for those who
are embezzlers."257
The Court's disposition of the case left no doubt that Skinner
was an equal protection, not a due process, decision. If the
proposed sterilization had been an unconstitutional deprivation
of liberty without due process, the remedy would have been to
forbid the defendant's sterilization outright. But the case had
been decided on the grounds that the defendant's punishment
was unequal to those who had committed the same kind of
offense. Therefore, the Court explained, "It is by no means clear
whether if an excision were made, this particular constitutional
difficulty might be solved by enlarging on the one hand or contracting on the other.., the class of criminals who might be
sterilized.""5 The State could choose not to sterilize Mr. Skinner or to begin sterilizing three-time embezzlers as wellY 9
As the Court has further developed the fundamental rights
branch of equal protection, the emphasis on comparative disadvantage has been essential to the Court's analysis and disposition of the case. For example, in Griffin v. Illinois,26 the
State refused to provide indigents with free trial transcripts
256. Id. at 538, 544 (Stone, C.J., concurring). The court's reluctance to rely on the
Due Process Clause was probably related to the fact that in West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), the Court had recently abandoned the expansive reading of liberty under the Due Process Clause that had characterized Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
257. Id. at 541.

258. Id. at 543 (citations omitted).
259. Chief Justice Stone was not convinced that the majority was serious on this
latter point. He explained, "[i]f Oklahoma may resort generally to the sterilization of

criminals on the assumption that their propensities are transmissible to future generations by inheritance, I seriously doubt that the equal protection clause requires it to

apply the measure to all criminals in the first instance, or to none." Id.
260. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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necessary for the appeal of their criminal convictions. Standing
alone, this would not amount to a denial of due process because
the Court had made it clear that "a State is not required by
the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right
to appellate review at all."261 However, once the state did create an appellate system in which defendants with sufficient
funds obtained appellate review of their convictions, then the
state had to make appellate review equally available to everyone, wealthy or poor. 2
26
Similarly, in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,
the Court held that a Virginia poll tax of $1.50 violated the
Equal Protection Clause. The Court applied heightened scrutiny
because the fundamental right to vote in state elections was
involved. One problem with this analysis is that "the right to
vote in state elections is nowhere expressly mentioned [in the
Constitution]." '264 But in terms of comparative disadvantage,
the plaintiffs in Harper had a good case. Once the state had
created an electorate, the fundamental right to vote had to be
granted to everyone on equal terms.2 65 Equality was clearly
the essence of the claim in Harper.

The Court's decisions in Skinner, Griffin, and Harper provide
the necessary background for Shapiro v. Thompson,26 a fundamental rights case in which the Equal Protection Clause was
necessarily implicated. The Shapiro Court addressed the issue
of whether denying welfare assistance to those who met all but
the one-year residency requirement constituted an unconstitutional penalty on the fundamental right to travel. If an independent right to travel were the entire constitutional claim, it
would make no difference to the plaintiffs case whether or not
261. Id. at 18.
262. Id. The Court stated:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all who
have money enough to pay the costs in advance .... Consequently at
all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and the Equal Protection
Clause protect persons like petitioners from invidious discriminations.

Id.
263.
264.
265.
266.

383 U.S. 663 (1966).
Id. at 665.
Id.
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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the State penalized others in the exercise of their right to travel. But it is impossible to identify this "penalty" in
noncomparative terms. The State had no obligation to fund a
welfare program at all.26 Surely the total absence of a welfare
program is more harmful to a newly arrived indigent than is a
one-year waiting period. Yet the failure to create a program at
all would not have been a penalty on the right to travel. Similarly, the noncomparative penalty analysis is inapplicable to
those newcomers immigrating from states that had no welfare
programs. How could it be a penalty for those newcomers when
by moving to a new state they become eligible for welfare for
the first time? The result in Shapiro stands for the proposition
that once the state chooses to enact a welfare program, the
state must make the program equally available to everyone.
Thus, the nature of the wrong in Shapiro was comparative,
that is, the state made benefits available to established, but not
newly arrived, indigents. The result in Shapiro is a function of
its equal protection component.
Shapiro, like Skinner, Griffin, and Harper, involved a fundamental right and is only understandable in comparative terms.
Therefore, all four are equal protection cases. Although the
plaintiffs may not have had independent, individual claims to
the relief they sought, they-prevailed because of their comparative equal protection claims.
B. The Penalty Component of the Court's Analysis
The Court strictly scrutinizes classifications which penalize
those who exercise their right to travel. 6 8 Yet not all waiting
periods or other disadvantages imposed on new residents are
penalties. 9 The Court's precedents do not explain how to identify a forbidden penalty from an acceptable classification. For

267. This is at least the implicit message of Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970), where the Court acknowledged that the Constitution may impose procedural
safeguards on the operation of a welfare program. Id. at 487 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)). In Dandridge, an existing welfare program was subject to
the limitations of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 485. "[N]either the State nor
Federal governments are under any sort of constitutional obligation to guarantee
minimum levels of support." Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 584 & n.9 (1976) (citing
Dandridge, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)).
268. See supra part II.B.
269. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638 & n.21.
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example, in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,27 a majority of the Court summarized its earlier penalty analysis by
explaining that the denial of a fundamental political right or of
basic necessities of life to those who have recently exercised
their right to travel is a penalty. 7 1 On the other hand, in
Sosna v. Iowa,272 the majority opinion implied that a denial of
a right or benefit may not be a penalty if it is temporary. 3
In Attorney General v. Soto-Lopez2 74 , a plurality of the Court
attempted to explain penalty analysis as triggered by the permanent denial of a significant or substantial benefit." 5 These
inconsistencies are evidence of the substantial difficulties with
the Court's analysis. This section examines those difficulties in
turn.
1. The Problem of Redundancy
One of the Court's definitions of "penalty on the right to
travel" is the denial of a fundamental political right to those
who have recently exercised their right to travel. 6 This explanation is redundant. If the right to travel is a fundamental
right, then the Court should not need to identify the denial of a
second fundamental right, such as voting, before finding a penalty on the right to travel. The Court seems to suggest that the
state can burden one fundamental right at a time, but not two
fundamental rights together. Since that suggestion is obviously
unacceptable, the alternative conclusion is that the right to
travel portion of the analysis is unnecessary. The waiting period in Dunn would thus be unconstitutional simply because it
infringed the fundamental right to vote. Additional reference to

270.
271.
272.
273.

415 U.S. 250 (1974).
Id. at 259.
419 U.S. 393 (1975).
Id. at 406.
Appellant was not irretrievably foreclosed from obtaining some part of
what she sought, as was the case with the welfare recipients in Shapiro,
the voters in Dunn, or the indigent patient in Maricopa County. She
would eventually qualify for the same sort of adjudication which she
demanded virtually upon her arrival in the State.

Id.
274. 476 U.S. 898 (1986).
275. Id. at 908-09.
276. See Memorial Hosp., 415 U.S. at 259.
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a second fundamental right, the right to travel, would be superfluous. If this is true, the "penalty on the right to travel" analysis collapses.
2. The Problem of Consistency
Alternatively, the Court has attempted to explain penalty
analysis as arising when the state burdens the right to travel
by depriving newcomers of basic necessities, like welfare and
medical care. 7 But Lindsey v. Normet,278 Dandridge v. Williams,2 79 and San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez"0 undermine this reasoning. In those cases, claims to basic necessities of life were of no special constitutional significance and received no special constitutional scrutiny. Therefore, in constitutional terms, the loss of welfare benefits is of no greater
concern than the loss of the opportunity to get a divorce or to
attend the state university at reduced tuition rates. Yet the
Court has found that the denial of tuition benefits2"' or of access to divorce courts 2 is not a penalty. The Court's opinions,
thus, contradict each other. Basic necessities are, on one hand,
of no special constitutional significance; on the other hand, the
denial of basic necessities constitutes a penalty triggering strict
scrutiny.
It is instructive to see how the Court's precedents pull in
opposite directions in the area of education. In Vlandis, the
Court implicitly found that a one-year durational residence
requirement for lower university tuition was not a penalty."
In Rodriguez, the Court held that public elementary and secondary education is not a fundamental right.' Nor could it
reasonably be claimed that education is a basic necessity. It

277. Id.
278. 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (housing not a fundamental right).
279. 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (welfare not a fundamental right).
280. 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (education not a fundamental right).
281. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
282. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
283. Wandis, 412 U.S. at 452 ("Nor should our decision be construed to deny a
State the right to impose on a student, as one element in demonstrating bona fide
residence, a reasonable durational residency requirement, which can be met while in
student status.").
284. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33-35.
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would follow then that the state could enact a one-year durational residence requirement to be satisfied by new residents
wishing to attend public schools. Such a denial of education,
according to the Court's precedents, would not be a penalty on
the right to travel and the exclusion would only have to meet
the Court's minimum rationality standard. The logic of the
Court's penalty analysis demands this result, but the Court's
own precedents suggest otherwiseY
An additional problem with the Court's assertion in Memorial
Hospital that penalties on the right to travel are limited to
denials of fundamental rights or basic necessities is that such
claims have been ignored by subsequent decisions. Since Memorial Hospital, the Court has invalidated state laws denying to
newcomers such benefits as a property tax exemption, 6 a civil service job," 7 and a share in the distribution of Alaska's oil
wealth."' Certainly, none of those interests could be properly
characterized as fundamental or basic necessities. The Court
did not even find it necessary to engage in its earlier penalty
analysis to decide these latter cases.
3. The Problem of Measurement: When Does An Incidental
Burden Become A Penalty?
Another difficulty with the Court's penalty analysis arises
from the Court's suggestion that a denial of a right or benefit
may not be a penalty if the denial is trivial. "Trivial" in this
context means that the denial is either short-term or of an
insignificant interest. For instance, in Sosna, the Court was not
overly concerned about a new resident who could not get a
divorce right away because eventually she would qualify. 9
Although seven years is a long time to wait to run for governor,
a seven-year waiting period is not a penalty because the chance
285. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) ("Public education is not a 'right'
granted to individuals by the Constitution ... But neither is it merely some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation .... In sum, education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our
society.").
286. Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985).
287. Attorney Gen. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986).
288. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
289. Sosna, 419 U.S. at 406.
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to run for that office would be of very little concern to most
persons.290
The idea that trivial denials of rights do not raise constitutional concerns is dangerous. As the Court said in the same
right to travel context, "even temporary deprivations of very
important benefits and rights can operate to penalize migration."29' The Court found constitutionally impermissible such
state-imposed trivial sums as a $1.50 poll tax or a $1.00 tax
9
As Professor Tribe
on passengers leaving the state by rail."
has explained, "[a] one dollar fine for choosing to be critical of
government, for example, would be as clearly suspect as a one
thousand dollar fine."2"
Notwithstanding these concerns, in order to continue using
penalty analysis, the Court will have to distinguish between
permissible incidental burdens and impermissible penalties.
Remember that if a state law is enacted with the purpose of
inhibiting interstate migration, the Court does not need to resort to penalty analysis. Such laws trigger strict scrutiny automatically and are invalid. 5 The penalty analysis then applies
only to state laws that are enacted to serve lawful purposes but
have an incidental effect on interstate travel. In these situations, incidental and inconsequential impacts on interstate travel should not trigger strict scrutiny. The fact that New Jersey
and Delaware impose a toll on interstate travelers crossing the
Delaware Memorial Bridge is not something that should implicate strict scrutiny. 6
The problem is that, once it is conceded that insignificant
and incidental burdens do not penalize the right to travel, from
that point there is no principled way to identify a clear line at
which insignificant burdens become significant enough to be
290. Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211, 1218 (D.N.H. 1973), affd, 414 U.S.
802 (1973) ("It cannot be seriously argued that the inability to run for Governor is a
While the Governorship of New Hampshire
real impediment to interstate travel ....
may be a coveted prize, it is one that is seriously sought after by only a very few.").

291. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 907.
292. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
293. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
294. TRIBE, supra note 47, at 1457 & n.18.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 31-34.
296. This example is taken from Justice Rebnquist. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250, 284 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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characterized as penalties. If a one-year durational residence
requirement for university tuition is not a penalty, then what
about a two-year requirement? What about a one-year durational residence requirement for public elementary school? There
can be a clear answer to these questions. However, that answer
would require the Court to abandon the idea that penalties are
measured on some hypothetical absolute scale. Penalties should
be viewed as comparative.
There already exists a bright line which the Court could use
to separate the permissible from the impermissible; that bright
line is the state's current treatment of its existing residents. If
newcomers are treated as well as current residents, they have
no equal protection claim. For example, if the state adopted a
one-year durational residence requirement before newcomers
could get a driver's license, that appears to be discrimination
against newcomers and, to use the Court's analysis, is a
penalty on the right to travel. Compare a state law setting a
minimum age of eighteen to obtain a driver's license, applicable
to all residents.2 97 A newly arrived seventeen-year-old with a
license to drive in her previous state of residence would lose
the right to drive. But this deprivation would not be a penalty
on the right to travel. If the Court must look for penalties, the
test should involve a comparison of how established residents
are treated. The state could still distinguish between older and
newer residents; but it would need a good reason for doing
98
SO.

2

4. The Elusive Penalty/Subsidy Distinction 299
Since the state has no obligation to establish any welfare
program, the denial of welfare benefits to newcomers is arguably not a penalty, but a mere refusal to subsidize the right to
travel. This attempt to distinguish between penalties and subsidies raises the question of an "unconstitutional condition.""'

297. This example is taken from Justice Marshall. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S
330, 342 & n.12 (1971).
298. See infra part V.B.5.
299. See generally TRIBE, supra note 47, at 781-84.
300. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court 1987 Term: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 5
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government's ability to impose conditions when it confers a
benefit on an individual."' For example, the government cannot insist that citizens waive their free speech rights in order
to receive welfare benefits. The Court has applied this "unconstitutional condition" doctrine in its abortion funding decisions."0 2 The Court explained that the privacy right established in Roe v. Wade"'3 "protects the woman from unduly
burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to
terminate her pregnancy."0 4 However, the privacy right established in Roe did not require that the state subsidize a
woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy.0 5 Specifically, the
government could choose to promote childbirth over abortion by
paying for the expenses of childbirth but not abortion. This
choice is not a penalty on a woman's decision to terminate a
pregnancy0 6 and thus does not trigger strict scrutiny.
The widespread criticism of this distinction between penalties
and subsidies is that it unjustifiably assumes the existence of a
particular baseline of government activity from which departures may be measured.0 7 Thus, in the abortion funding cases, the Court must have assumed a baseline of no government
funding for medical procedures.08 ' From that point, the state

(1988).
301. Id. at 6-7. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that:
even if a state has absolute discretion to grant or deny a privilege or
benefit, it cannot grant the privilege subject to conditions that improperly
'coerce,' 'pressure,' or 'induce' the waiver of constitutional rights. Thus, in
the context of individual rights, the doctrine provides that on at least
some occasions receipt of a benefit to which someone has no constitutional entitlement does not justify making that person abandon some right
guaranteed under the Constitution.
Id.
302. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
303. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
304. Maher, 432 U.S. at 473-74.
305. Id. at 474 ("[Roe] implies no limitation on the authority of a State to make a
value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by
the allocation of public fimds.").
306. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 & n.19 (1980) ("[T]he Hyde Amendment,
like the Connecticut welfare provision at issue in Maher, represents simply a refusal
to subsidize certain protected conduct. A refusal to fund protected activity, without
more, cannot be equated with the imposition of a 'penalty' on that activity.").
307. Epstein, supra note 300, at 99.
308. Harris,448 U.S. at 317 ("[Tihe fact remains that the Hyde Amendment leaves
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funding of childbirth would be a subsidy to childbirth, not a
penalty on abortion. Indigent women seeking abortions would
be no worse off than they would have been in their assumed
baseline condition. However, if one begins with the equally
plausible baseline of government funding for all medically necessary procedures for those who qualify for Medicaid," 9 then
the withdrawal of funding for abortions would be a penalty on
the exercise of a fundamental right. Indigent women seeking
abortions would then be now worse off than they would have
been in their assumed baseline condition. The problem is that
in a complex regulatory state, there is no agreement on assumed baselines.
This absence of assumed baselines clouds the issue of whether or not the denial of welfare benefits for one year is a penalty
on the exercise of the right to travel. Once again, the answer to
that question depends on the baseline that is chosen. If the
common law, minimal state baseline is selected, in which the
state has enacted no social welfare programs, then the refusal
to extend welfare benefits to recent arrivals would be simply a
decision not to subsidize them. The recent arrivals would be in
no worse a position than they would have been at the baseline.
On the other hand, if we select the current regulatory welfare
state as the baseline, in which the state provides an extensive
array of welfare services, then the refusal to include new arrivals is a penalty on the exercise of their right to travel. They
are in a worse position than they otherwise would have been,
because of the exercise of their right to travel. The Court in
Shapiro assumed this later, modern day welfare state as the
baseline, and found that the one-year waiting period was a
penalty. But, of course, the baseline in other cases is not as
easily identified. In Memorial Hospital, the Court again assumed that the baseline was one of government-provided medical services, and the waiting period was therefore a penalty. On
the other hand, in Vlandis, the Court must have assumed that
the baseline did not include publicly provided university educa-

an indigent woman with at least the same range of choice in deciding whether to
obtain a medically necessary abortion as she would have had if Congress had chosen
to subsidize no health care costs at all.").
309. E.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1415, 1440 (1989).

1994]

CLASSIFICATIONS THAT DISADVANTAGE NEWCOMERS

607

tion, so that the denial of resident status for tuition purposes
was not a penalty.
5. Summary: A Comparative Alternative
From a practical perspective, the Court's penalty aialysis
was valuable because it rescued newcomers from the certain
defeat of deferential rational basis review. But the penalty
analysis is seriously flawed. It is flawed in application because
the Court does not follow it with any consistency. It is flawed
in theory because its focus is misguided. The Court purports to
be examining an abstract concept of interstate travel when it
should be focusing on comparative disadvantage to newcomers.
However, if the Court abandons its penalty analysis, it should
not go to the other extreme leaving newcomers to a standard of
review that is so deferential as to be meaningless. The constitutional policy of free interstate migration and the fact that newcomers were not represented when today's laws were passed
should move the Court in the direction of a genuine, serious,
and 10consistent review of state discrimination against newcom3
ers.
Not that states should always treat newcomers the same as
established residents: the comparative idea of equality simply
requires that a state that grants some benefit or lessens some
burden for established residents must have good reason for
failing to do likewise for newcomers. The Court should clarify
what reasons are adequate and what reasons are not. The
Court has begun this process, albeit unsystematically. As indicated above, the Court has approved a limited use of short-term
durational residence requirements when used as evidence of
bona fide residence or when necessary to achieve administrative
objectives. The Court has approved the use of communitarian
justifications as qualifications for elective office. The Court has

310. Such a review would be consistent with what Justice Marshall has long
championed. Marshall has criticized the Court's rigid, tiered system of equal protection and argued in its place for a flexible review that would take into account the
character of the classification and the relative importance to the individuals in the
class of the governmental benefit that they do not receive. See, e.g., Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting.).
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not approved any other reasons for treating newcomers differently from established residents.

VI. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The attempt to impose additional burdens on new arrivals is
more than a historical curiosity. Hard economic times have
recently given rise to new attempts to decrease the benefits or
impose additional taxes on recent arrivals. These situations
illustrate that it is simply human nature to shift burdens onto
someone else. They also demonstrate that the Supreme Court's
analysis of equality for newcomers has been unclear and unhelpful, leaving state legislators unsure of the limits on their
power in this area. This lack of clarity becomes an invitation
for aggressive politicians to victimize newcomers, a group whose
interests are not represented in the legislative process.
A. Delaying or Reducing Welfare Benefits for Newcomers and
the Legacy of Shapiro v. Thompson
Since 1990, California,"' New York,"' Wisconsin,"' and
Minnesota 14 have reduced the welfare benefits available to
new residents. Unlike the situation in Shapiro, these states
have not eliminated benefits entirely. Rather, the limitation
established in each of these states is that for an initial period,
either six months or one year, a new resident will not receive
welfare benefits any higher than those received in the state of
previous residence. The purported purpose of these limits is to
make the receipt of welfare benefits a neutral factor in a
person's decision to move to a new state. 15 Welfare would be
a neutral factor, it is argued, because the level of one's benefits
would not increase as the result of moving to a new state.3 16

311. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450.03 (West Supp. 1994).
312. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 158(f) (Consol. Supp. 1993).
313. WIsc. STAT. ANN. § 49.19(11)(m) (West Supp. 1993-94).
314. MINN. STAT. § 256D.065 (1992).

315. Mitchell v. Steffen, 504 N.W.2d 198, 204 (Minn. 1993) (Tomljanovich, J., dissenting).
316. Id. at 206.
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The Court will have to decide what concepts underpin
Shapiro in the light of these welfare limiting statutes. Arguably, the penalty in Shapiro consisted in the lack of any substitute benefits at all for the period of one year, a lack that deterred and penalized the free movement of indigents from one
state to another. From this perspective, the "penalty" is eliminated if a new resident is allowed to remain at the same benefit level she held in her previous state of residence. How can
there be a penalty if the recipient is no worse off than she was
before?
The two courts that have considered this issue have both
rejected this argument.3 17 First, as a factual matter, it fails to
account for different costs of living. A benefit of $190 per month
in Louisiana is not the equivalent of $190 in California. 18 The
higher cost of living is, of course, one of the reasons behind the
higher benefit level in California. More importantly, these statutes do not recognize that Shapiro was, above all, an equality
decision. The Court in Shapiro did not consider the benefit
levels of the plaintiffs before they moved to the new state, nor
even the fact that they had been receiving welfare at all. The
problem in Shapiro was comparative. Connecticut was not required to have any welfare, but since it did, the program had to
be equally available to all residents. The relevant comparison,
then, was between newcomers and the established residents of
the new state.319 The welfare levels in the previous state were
simply irrelevant. The right that was violated, while implicating
the right to travel, was best explained as a "right to equal
treatment without regard to length of residency." 2 '
The California and Minnesota attempts to confer no benefit
levels higher than those held in the previous state of residence
were quickly found unconstitutional."' The New York and
Wisconsin plans have not yet been the subject of a published
court opinion. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, has

317.
198.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Cal. 1993); Mitchell, 504 N.W.2d
Green, 811 F. Supp. at 521.
Id.; Mitchell, 504 N.W.2d at 201.
Green, 811 F. Supp. at 519.
Id. at 516; Mitchell, 504 N.W.2d 198.
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already approved an additional welfare reduction strategy. 22
This strategy attempts to avoid the effect of Shapiro by reducing the waiting period instead of the benefit levels for new
arrivals. While the Court in Shapiro forbade a one-year waiting
period for welfare benefits, Wisconsin recently created a 60-day
waiting period before new residents would be eligible for general relief.2 '
This strategy also requires reconsideration of the Court's
"penalty" analysis in Shapiro. If the conceptual basis of Shapiro
is that of comparative equality, then, even a short, 60-day denial of basic substance would be an unacceptable discrimination
against new residents; on the other hand, if the Court's emphasis should be noncomparative, then the substantially shorter
waiting period in the Wisconsin statute might not rise to the
level of a penalty. Mathematically, it is only one-sixth of the
deprivation in Shapiro. A majority of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court adopted the second method of analysis, indicating that
the length of the deprivation was short enough to not constitute
4 Thus the court applied only rational basis
a penalty.
5
review.
Sixty days is a short enough period that there are two possibly adequate justifications for it under the Court's earlier precedents. First, as in the voting registration cases, 26 the state
might claim the administrative necessity of having sufficient
time to handle required paperwork. Alternatively, as in the
student tuition cases, 27 the state could argue that the sixtyday waiting period is useful evidence of bona fide residence and
thus helpful in distinguishing residents from transients. But
Wisconsin argued instead that the sixty-day waiting period was
rationally related to the purpose of encouraging employment.32 From a comparative perspective, the argument is defective because Wisconsin does not appear to be making any
effort to similarly encourage the employment of established resi-

322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

Jones v. Milwaukee County, 485 N.W.2d 21 (Wis. 1992).
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 49.015 (West Sup. 1993).
Jones, 485 N.W.2d at 22-25.
Id. at 28.
See supra part IV.F.
See supra text accompanying notes 42-54.
Jones, 485 N.W.2d at 27-28.
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dents. 29 Why are newcomers singled out to bear the burden
of this new regulation? The one obvious answer is that the real
purpose of the statute is to keep out those who cannot support
themselves.
B. Shifting the Tax Burden to Newcomers and the Legacy of
Zobel v. Williams
In the wake of sharply rising property taxes, the voters of
California in 1978 adopted Proposition 13,30 an amendment to
the California Constitution which imposed sharp limits on property taxes. Specifically, under Proposition 13, property taxes
could not exceed 1% of the acquisition value of real property
and the property tax assessment could not increase more than
2% per year. 33' But how could local governments in California
freeze their tax rates and still pay for the rising costs of government services in years to come? The solution, at least in
part, was Proposition 13's "Welcome Stranger" system of taxation. The system received its name because "the newcomer to
an established community is 'welcome' in anticipation that he
will contribute a larger percentage of support for local government than his settled neighbor who owns a comparable
home. 33 2
The key to shifting the tax burden to newcomers was the
acquisition value assessment scheme. Since assessments were
linked to acquisition value, during periods of steep inflation in
the housing market those who purchased homes later received
much higher assessments for comparable houses. For example,
in 1988, ten years after the enactment of Proposition 13, Steph-

329. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637-38 (1969). The Court in Shapiro

stated:
Pennsylvania suggests that the one-year waiting period is justified as a
means of encouraging new residents to join the labor force promptly. But
this logic would also require a similar waiting period for long-term residents of the State. A state purpose to encourage employment provides no
rational basis for imposing a one-year waiting period restriction on new
residents only.

Id.
330. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § A.
331. Id.
332. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 2329 (1992).
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anie Nordlinger purchased a home in Los Angeles County for
$170,000, and shortly thereafter received a tax bill of
$1,701." 3' One block away, a long-established neighbor with a
virtually identical house paid only $358 in property tax." Ms.
Nordlinger was sufficiently upset by the disparity to take her
case all the way to the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court considered the validity of Proposition 13
and its adverse impact on newcomers in Nordlinger v.
Hahn.335 Once again, the Court's treatment of the appropriate
level of review was unsatisfactory. The Court considered the
case to clearly warrant a straightforward application of rational
basis review, a "standard [that] is especially deferential in the
context of classifications made by complex tax laws."3 36 At
first glance, Proposition 13 appears to be a penalty on the right
to travel in that it disadvantages all new California residents
by requiring them to carry a disproportionate share of the tax
burden. However, there are two ways to avoid the conclusion
that Proposition 13 penalizes the right to travel. Neither response is entirely satisfactory.
The California Court of Appeals rejected the right to travel
argument because Proposition 13 does not distinguish between
citizens on the basis of residence, but rather on the basis of the
time at which they acquire property."' 1 Thus, any benefit to
long-term Californians was incidental. In fact, many long-term
Californians would be disadvantaged when they purchased new
homes. The United States Supreme Court rejected the right to
travel argument on the alternative ground that the petitioner,
Stephanie Nordlinger, lacked standing to raise it. 38 Since she
had been a resident of California before she purchased her new
home, she could not argue that her right to interstate travel
had been infringed.
A generous reading to its earlier treatment of this issue in
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County would have justified the

333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

Id. at 2330.
Id.
112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992).
Id. at 2332.
Id. at 2331.
Id. at 2332.
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Court in allowing Ms. Nordinger to raise the right to travel
claim. 39 In that case, the plaintiff complained of an Arizona
county residence requirement that equally disadvantaged immigrants from both other counties in Arizona and other states." °
Like Proposition 13, the Arizona law was not an explicit classification based on state residence. The Court nevertheless concluded that the right to interstate travel was implicated because the state could not accomplish indirectly, through a county requirement, what it was prohibited from accomplishing
directly."' One of the effects, even if not the principal effect,
of the county residence requirement was an impermissible penalty on interstate migration. Similarly, even if the principal
negative effects of Proposition 13 would be felt by California
residents, it would also have significant effects on interstate
migration. All those who benefitted from the law would be longterm residents of California and all interstate migrants to California would be comparatively disadvantaged. Under the Court's
reasoning in Memorial Hospital, that disparity should be
enough to implicate the right to travel. However, it was not
enough for the Court in Nordlinger. The plaintiffs case would
have been strengthened by the addition of a recent arrival from
out of state as a co-plaintiff.
However, Proposition 13's treatment of newcomers could have
easily failed even rational basis review. Although the Court in
Zobel v. Williams,"2 used a rational basis standard to invalidate discrimination against newcomers, it was definitely not the
Court's traditional rational basis review. Only reference to the
right to travel or some special concern for newcomers can explain the close scrutiny which the Court used in that case to
invalidate the statute. But the Court in Zobel refused to acknowledge that it was engaging in anything more than rational
basis review. Thus, the majority in Zobel left open the possibility that a future Court could take them at their word. This is
what happened in Nordlinger. Superficially, the Court's decision
was consistent with Zobel, but in fact it used a far more deferential standard of review.

339.
340.
341.
342.

415 U.S. 250 (1974).
Id. at 252.
Id. at 255-56.
457 U.S. 55 (1982).
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In applying this deferential standard of review, the majority
opinion in Zobel intimated that the acquisition value assessment scheme may not be unequal treatment at all."S Even if
there were some inequalities, the Court found that Proposition
13's acquisition value assessment scheme was rationally related
to the preservation of neighborhood stability and to the protection of the reliance interests of established residents. 4 These
three arguments will be examined more closely.
First, consider the argument that Proposition 13 does not
create any inequalities. By way of comparison, the Court in
Zobel forbade the distribution of the oil funds on the basis of
length of residence, but implicitly approved an equal payment
to all current residents. Even such an equal payment would not
resolve the equality problem permanently. If in 1980, Alaska
made a one-time payment of $1,000 to every resident, Zobel's
requirement would be satisfied. But what about the new residents arriving in 1981 and thereafter? Although they would
surely be disappointed, neither Zobel nor any other Court opinion has ever suggested that the state has any obligation to
make up to new residents for the benefits that accrue from past
equal treatment of earlier residents. Suppose then that in 1980
Alaska purchased for each current resident a $1,000 lifetime
annuity. This would be no different and no more unconstitutional than the payment of $1,000 in a lump sum. However, it
is likely that those arriving in 1981 and thereafter would feel
even greater resentment as they saw their neighbors receiving
annual annuity checks. Presumably, however, following Zobel,
those checks would be viewed as benefits accruing from past
equal treatment, rather than present unequal treatment, and
would not be impermissible.

343. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 2332-33 (1992). The Nordinger court
stated:
As between newer and older owners, Article XIIIA does not discriminate
with respect to either the tax rate or the annual rate of adjustment in
assessments. Newer and older owners alike benefit in both the short and
long run from the protections of a 1% tax rate ceiling and no more than
a 2% increase in assessment value per year. New owners and old owners
are treated differently with respect to one factor only-the basis on which
their property is initially assessed.

Id.
344. Id. at 2333.
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Returning then to Proposition 13 and Nordlinger, consider
the question: Is the acquisition value assessment scheme current unequal treatment of residents, or are the different tax
levels merely benefits accruing from past equal treatment?
There is no clear answer to this question. On one hand, since
the state is free to make new assessments each year, the differentials can be viewed as current unequal treatment. On the
other hand, since the state gave everyone an acquisition value
assessment in 1978 and continues to do so for subsequent acquisitions, the tax differentials could be viewed as simply a
reflection of advantages gained from inflation in the private
market and thus as benefits accruing from past equal treatment.
Even if some inequality results from the acquisition value
scheme, the majority in Nordlinger considered that inequality to
be justified by promotion of neighborhood preservation, continuity, and stability. 5 This argument is partly communitarian. It
suggests that those who stay in one place for a long time deserve a reward. Stability enhances a sense of community and
often enhances community resources. Thus, in some situations
seniority should be rewarded. Those societies that revere the
elderly do so on the assumption that long experience brings
wisdom and that wisdom is very beneficial to the community.
Although the state ought not be allowed to impose
communitarian mandates on membership in the state as a
whole, 46 Proposition 13 is a far more benign attempt to support small communities in their attempts to preserve themselves. Thus the acquisition value scheme is rationally related
to this legitimate concern for the community.
The final justification accepted by the majority was the protection of reliance. As the Court explained, "a new owner at the
time of acquiring his property does not have the same reliance
interest warranting protection against higher taxes as does an
existing owner." 4 7 This probably means that a homeowner
who has been paying property taxes of $500 per year has a
reliance interest in keeping them at that level. If property taxes

345. Id.
346. See supra part IV.C.
347. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2333.
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increase too much, the homeowner may have to sell her home.
On the other hand, a new purchaser has not relied on the past
assessment, and, she can take into account the high property
taxes when deciding whether to purchase the house in the first
place.34
Notwithstanding the majority's ready acceptance of the stability and reliance arguments, a plausible application of Zobel to
Nordlinger suggests that it should have reached a different
result. In Zobel, the Court rejected the state's distribution of
state funds on the basis of length of residence, and then asked
rhetorically, "Could states impose different taxes based on
length of residence?"34 The Court obviously thought not, for
this would create the impermissible result of the state
"divid[ing] citizens into expanding numbers of permanent classes."350 But this was precisely the impermissible result of Proposition 13. California enacted a program that in fact does impose different taxes based on length of residence. Proposition 13
appears to divide citizens into expanding numbers of permanent
classes; each class consisting of those Californians who acquired
their property on a given day. Proposition 13 appears to be
nothing more than the "selective provision of benefits based on
the timing of one's membership in a class." 51 Justice Stevens
in dissent was not persuaded by the reliance interest justification. To him, the defense of reliance did no more than restate
the discrimination being challenged. 3 " Established homeowners, having been preferred by Proposition 13, had come to rely
on that preferred position and did not wish to not be dislodged
from it."3 For Stevens, this was an unacceptable bootstrapping argument, not a justification based on reliance. "[T]he
Court seems to be saying that earlier purchases can benefit
under Proposition 13 because earlier purchasers benefit under
Proposition 13. " "4 That is a tautology, not a justification.55

348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.

Id.
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 64 (1982).
Id.
Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2348 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2347 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2347 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2344,
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VI. CONCLUSION

If Vivian Thompsons"6 could be found today, she might still
be living in Connecticut. She will have been a resident of Connecticut for twenty-seven years. Obviously, she would not be
currently disadvantaged by discrimination against newcomers.
Likewise, Stephanie Nordlinger may be an oldtimer in Baldwin
Hills twenty-seven years from now. She will probably have one
of the lowest tax bills in the neighborhood. Newcomers become
established residents. Established residents move and become
newcomers somewhere else. The rough edges in time are
smoothed over.
In the meantime, however, feelings of resentment arise when
some people appear to receive a better deal from the government than their similarly situated neighbors, just because they
have been around longer. In the private sector, this comparative disadvantaging of newcomers is "an idea whose time may
have passed."35 If its time has passed, it will not be out of
concerns over abstract justice or the Constitution, but because
it turned out to be inefficient. The cost savings from paying
new workers less than established workers was outweighed by
the tensions it created in the workplace and by the psychological toll it took on the everyday workforce. 58 This evidence of
efficiency, added to the claims of equality discussed above, indicates that newcomers should not be made to bear the burdens
that long-term residents are unwilling to carry themselves.

356. Vivian Thompson was one of the named parties in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 623 (1969).
357. Clifford J. Levy, An Idea Whose Time May Have Passed," N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
17, 1993, at D1.
358. Id. at D4.

